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Bartlett v. Strickland
07-689
Ruling Below: Pender County v. Bartlett, 361 N.C. 491, 649 S.E.2d 364, 2007 N.C. LEXIS
816; cert. granted, Bartlett v. Strickland, 128 S.Ct. 1648, 2008 U.S. LEXIS 2446 (2008).
In 2003, redistricting by the North Carolina General Assembly, Pender County was divided
between two legislative districts. Officials of Pender County brought suit against the state,
claiming a violation of a North Carolina Constitutional requirement that legislative districts be
drawn along county lines as much as possible. The State claimed the dividing of Pender County
was necessary to comply with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which prohibits the
dilution of the voting power of minority groups in certain circumstances. The Pender County
officials claimed that Pender County did not meet the requirements of a Section 2 voting district,
and the State thus was required to comply with state law. The Supreme Court of North Carolina
agreed with Pender County officials and found that Pender County did not meet the requirements
of Section 2.
Question Presented: Whether a racial minority group that constitutes less than 50% of a
proposed district's population can state a vote dilution claim under Section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973.
PENDER COUNTY, Dwight Strickland, individually and as a Pender County
Commissioner, David Williams, individually and as a Pender County Commissioner, F.D.
Rivenbark, individually and as a Pender County Commissioner, Stephen Holland,
individually and as a Pender County Commissioner, and Eugene Meadows, individually
and as a Pender County Commissioner, Petitioners,
v.
Gary BARTLETT, as Executive Director of the North Carolina State Board of Elections;
Larry Leake, Robert Cordel, Genevieve C. Sims, Lorraine G Shins, and Charles Winfree,
in their official capacities as members of the State Board of Elections; James B. Black, in
his official capacity as Co-Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives;
Richard T. Morgan, in his official capacity as Co-Speaker of the North Carolina House of
Representatives; Marc Basnight, in his official capacity as President Pro Tempore of the
North Carolina Senate; Michael Easley, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of
North Carolina; and Roy Cooper, in his official capacity as Attorney General of the State
of North Carolina, Respondents.
Supreme Court of North Carolina
Decided August 24, 2007
EDMUNDS, Justice: geographic configuration and racial
composition of North Carolina House
In this case, we consider whether the current District 18 as established by the North
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Carolina General Assembly was required by
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
We conclude that the Voting Rights Act did
not mandate the creation of a Section 2
"crossover" district and that House District
18 violates the Whole County Provision of
the Constitution of North Carolina.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the
three-judge panel below.
The General Assembly's redistricting
powers are confined and directed in several
respects. In the first instance, redistricting
"must comport with federal law."
Stephenson v. Bartlett, 355 N.C. 354, 363
(Stephenson I). In addition, the Constitution
of North Carolina enumerates several
limitations on the General Assembly's
redistricting authority. See N.C. Const. art.
II, §§ 3, 5. Those constitutional limitations
are binding upon the General Assembly
"except to the extent superseded by federal
law." Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 372. None
of the express limitations on redistricting in
our State Constitution is facially inconsistent
with federal law.
Two constitutional sections limiting
redistricting, collectively known as the
"Whole County Provision" (WCP), provide
"[n]o county shall be divided in the
formation of a senate district," N.C. Const.
art. II, § 3(3), and "[n]o county shall be
divided in the formation of a representative
district," id. art. II, § 5(3). Although federal
law is supreme, when "the primary purpose
of the WCP can be effected to a large degree
without conflict with federal law, it should
be adhered to by the General Assembly to
the maximum extent possible." Stephenson
I, 355 N.C. at 374. Moreover, "the WCP
cannot be applied in isolation or in a manner
that fails to comport with other requirements
of the State Constitution." Id. at 376.
Based upon data from the 2000 decennial
census, an ideal single-member North
Carolina House district holds 67,078
citizens. According to that census, Pender
County had 41,082 residents, or 61 percent
of the population required to support its own
House district. That census also indicated
that adjoining New Hanover County had
160,307 residents, or 239 percent of the
population needed for a single House
district. Combining these two counties
provided the population for approximately
three House districts.
The district in question, House District 18,
was drawn after this Court determined that
earlier redistricting efforts by the North
Carolina General Assembly failed to meet
federal and state standards. In Stephenson I,
we held that the General Assembly's 2001
state House and Senate legislative
redistricting plans violated the State
Constitution's WCP. 355 N.C. at 375.
Similarly, in Stephenson II, this Court held
that the General Assembly's proposed 2002
redistricting plans were also constitutionally
deficient. Stephenson v. Bartlett, 357 N.C.
301, 314 (2003) (Stephenson II). In the 2003
House redistricting plan promulgated after
the two Stephenson opinions, Pender County
was divided between two legislative
districts, House District 16 and House
District 18. Act of Nov. 25, 2003, ch. 434,
secs. 1-2, 2003 N.C. Sess. Laws (1st Extra
Sess. 2003) 1313, 1313-92. Both districts
encompass portions of Pender and New
Hanover Counties and thus cross county
lines.
The General Assembly drew House District
18 to meet the requirements of Section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA),
codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973
(2003). Section 2 of the VRA, which we
discuss in detail below, "generally provides
that states or their political subdivisions may
not impose any voting qualification or
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prerequisite that impairs or dilutes, on
account of race or color, a citizen's
opportunity to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of his or
her choice." Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 363.
Past election results in North Carolina
demonstrate that a legislative voting district
with a total African-American population of
at least 41.54 percent, or an African-
American voting age population of at least
38.37 percent, creates an opportunity to elect
African-American candidates. Accordingly,
in the 2003 House redistricting plan, the
General Assembly fashioned House District
18 with a total African-American population
of 42.89 percent, and an African-American
voting age population of 39.36 percent.
Defendants refer to House District 18 as an
"effective black voting district," with a
sufficient African-American population to
elect representatives of their choice.
On 14 May 2004, plaintiffs brought the
instant action. Pender County was a named
plaintiff, as were five persons suing both as
individuals and in their official capacities as
county commissioners of Pender County.
Defendants, consisting of the Executive
Director and members of the North Carolina
Board of Elections, the then co-Speakers of
the North Carolina House of
Representatives, the President Pro Tempore
of the North Carolina Senate, the Attorney
General, and the Governor of the State of
North Carolina, were all sued in their
official capacities. In their complaint,
plaintiffs contended that the 2003 House
redistricting plan violated the WCP by
dividing Pender County into House District
16 and House District 18. Defendants
responded that the division of Pender
County was required by Section 2 of the
VRA, which trumped the State Constitution.
On 2 December 2005, the three-judge panel
entered an order allowing partial summary
judgment in favor of defendants and denying
summary judgment for plaintiffs. . . . [T]he
panel examined House District 18 in light of
the United States Supreme Court's decision
in Thornburg v. Gingles, the leading case
interpreting Section 2. Gingles set out three
"necessary preconditions" a plaintiff is
required to demonstrate before he or she can
establish that a legislative district must be
drawn to comply with Section 2 or that an
existing district violates Section 2.
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50
(1986). These preconditions require a
plaintiff to show that: (1) a minority
population is "sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single-member district"; (2) the
minority population is "politically cohesive"
and thus votes as a bloc; and (3) the majority
population "votes sufficiently as a bloc to
enable it . .. usually to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate." By demonstrating
these three preconditions, a plaintiff can
show that a particular legislative district may
"impair minority voters' ability to elect
representatives of their choice." Id. at 50.
The three-judge panel held that House
District 18 met the first two Gingles
preconditions but determined that material
issues of fact remained as to whether the
third precondition had been satisfied.
Because the panel did not reach the issue of
whether House District 18 met the third
precondition, it declined to consider whether
the district also met the "totality of
circumstances" test prescribed by Gingles
and Section 2 of the VRA. Gingles, 478 U.S.
at 43 (explaining that Section 2 is violated
when the "totality of the circumstances"
establishes that members of a protected class
"have less opportunity than other members
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of the electorate to participate in the political
process and to elect representatives of their
choice").
Following the order of partial summary
judgment, the parties on 9 January 2006
filed another joint stipulation that the
Caucasian majority voted sufficiently as a
bloc to enable it usually to defeat the
African-American minority's preferred
candidate. Through this stipulation,
plaintiffs conceded House District 18 met
the third Gingles precondition. However,
plaintiffs did not stipulate that House
District 18 was required by Section 2 of the
VRA.
With the issues of material fact resolved as
to the third precondition, the three-judge
panel issued its final summary judgment
order on 9 January 2006. The panel
concluded House District 18 met all three of
the Gingles threshold preconditions and,
based on the totality of circumstances, the
creation of House District 18 as a crossover
district (i.e., one where the minority group
enjoys reliable support from members of the
majority who "cross over" racial or ethnic
lines to vote with the minority and elect the
minority's candidate) was required by
Section 2 of the VRA. Accordingly, the
panel held that House District 18 could split
Pender County and that the district
complied, to the maximum extent
practicable, with the legal requirements of
the WCP, as set out in Stephenson I.
An order allowing summary judgment is
reviewed de novo. Howerton v. Arai Helmet,
Ltd., 358 N.C. 440, 470 (2004). Summary
judgment is appropriate when "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact" and
"any party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." N.C.G.S. § lA-1, Rule 56(c)
(2005). An act of the General Assembly is
accorded a "strong presumption of
constitutionality" and is "presumed valid
unless it conflicts with the constitution."
Pope v. Easley, 354 N.C. 544, 546 (2001).
Section 2 of the VRA forbids any
"qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure . . . which
results in a denial or abridgement of the
right of any citizen of the United States to
vote on account of race or color" or
membership in a language minority group.
42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)(2003). A denial or
abridgement of the right to vote in violation
of Section 2 occurs when:
[B]ased on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the
political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State
or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens
protected by subsection (a) of this
section in that its members have
less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to
participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of their
choice. The extent to which
members of a protected class have
been elected to office in the State
or political subdivision is one
circumstance which may be
considered: Provided, That
nothing in this section establishes
a right to have members of a
protected class elected in numbers
equal to their proportion in the
population.
Id. § 1973(b) (2003). "The essence of a § 2
claim is that a certain electoral law, practice,
or structure interacts with social and
historical conditions to cause an inequality
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in the opportunities enjoyed" by minority
voters to elect their preferred
representatives. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47.
Consequently, Section 2 prohibits the
dilution, on account of race or color, of a
minority citizen's opportunity to participate
in the political process and to elect
representatives of his or her choice.
Stephenson I, 355 N.C. at 363. Although the
phrase "vote dilution" does not appear in
Section 2, the United States Supreme Court
has provided guidance on this issue. Vote
dilution of a racial minority group can occur
"by the dispersal of blacks into districts in
which they constitute an ineffective minority
of voters or from the concentration of blacks
into districts where they constitute an
excessive majority." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46
n. 11. "The phrase 'vote dilution,' in the
legal sense, simply refers to the
impermissible discriminatory effect that
a ... districting plan has when it operates 'to
cancel out or minimize the voting strength
of racial groups."' Id. at 87.
Although courts ultimately apply a totality
of the circumstances test to determine
whether a practice results in a denial or
abridgement of the right to vote, 42 U.S.C. §
1973(b), a plaintiff bringing a claim under
Section 2 must first establish the three
Gingles threshold preconditions. In the case
at bar, plaintiffs argue, and defendants do
not dispute, that these three preconditions
must exist before the General Assembly is
required to draw a legislative district
pursuant to Section 2. Failure to sustain any
one of the Gingles preconditions means that
the General Assembly is not required to
create a legislative district pursuant to
Section 2 to ensure that the votes of the
minority are not diluted. See Voinovich v.
Quilter, 507 U.S. 146, 158.
Only the first Gingles precondition is at
issue in this appeal. The narrow question
before us is whether this precondition, that a
minority group must be "sufficiently large
and geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single-member district," 478
U.S. at 50, requires that the minority group
constitute a numerical majority of the
relevant population, or whether a numerous
minority can satisfy the precondition. We
must determine whether the United States
Supreme Court in Gingles meant a
quantitative majority of the minority
population (i.e., greater than 50 percent), or
whether it meant instead a minority group
sufficiently large in population to have
significant impact on the election of
candidates but not of a size to control the
outcome without help from other racial
groups. The Supreme Court explicitly left
open this question in Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46
n.12, and has not answered it in several
cases since.
Before we can answer that question,
however, we must determine "which
characteristic of minority populations (e.g.,
age, citizenship) ought to be the touchstone"
for the first Gingles precondition. De
Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1008. We cannot
discuss the terms "minority" and "majority"
in the context of a redistricting case without
knowing what population we are
considering. In other words, a "majority" or
"minority" of what? Are we including the
entire population of the minority group in
the geographic area or are we limiting
consideration to a smaller subset of that
minority population? Although the United
States Supreme Court has left open this
question as well, dictum in Perry from a
unanimous Court indicates a majority should
be determined by the number of minority
citizens of voting age, not by its total
population: "Latinos, to be sure, are a bare
majority of the voting-age population in new
District 23, but only in a hollow sense, for
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the parties agree that the relevant numbers
must include citizenship. This approach fits
the language of § 2 because only eligible
voters affect a group's opportunity to elect
candidates." Perry, 126 S. Ct. at 2616.
We now return to the critical question on
appeal, whether the "sufficiently large and
geographically compact" minority
population must constitute a numerical
majority of citizens of voting age in order to
satisfy the first Gingles precondition. As we
undertake this analysis, we are mindful of at
least four distinct types of legislative
districts: (1) "majority-minority" districts,
(2) "coalition" districts, (3) "crossover"
districts, and (4) "influence" districts. A
majority-minority district is one "in which a
majority of the population is a member of a
specific minority group." Voinovich, 507
U.S. at 149. Majority-minority districts are
often called "safe" districts for the minority
because the minority group voters can vote
as a bloc to elect the candidates of their
choice without relying on voters of other
races.
By contrast, in the other types of legislative
districts, the predominant minority group
cannot consistently elect its candidate of
choice without the assistance of other racial
groups. Absent such help, even if every
eligible member of the minority group voted
for a single candidate, that candidate would
not be assured of electoral success. Thus, a
coalition district is one in which a minority
group joins with voters from at least one
other minority group to elect a candidate. De
Grandy, 512 U.S. at 1020. In a crossover
district, a minority group has "support from
a limited but reliable white crossover vote."
Rodriguez v. Pataki, 308 F. Supp. 2d 346,
376 (S.D.N.Y.) (2004). The terms
"coalition" district and "crossover" district
are sometimes used interchangeably, but we
distinguish them here because the former
refers to two or more minority groups
combining forces to elect a candidate, while
the latter refers to a minority group gaining
support from voters in the dominant racial
majority group. Finally, an influence district
is one in which a minority group is merely
large enough to influence the election of
candidates but too small to determine the
outcome. Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461,
470.
Plaintiffs contend that a minority group must
constitute a numerical majority of the voting
population in the area under consideration
before Section 2 of the VRA requires the
creation of a legislative district to prevent
dilution of the votes of that minority group.
They point to the wording of the first
Gingles precondition, which says a minority
group must be "sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single-member district," 478
U.S. at 50, and claim this language permits
only majority-minority districts to be formed
in response to a Section 2 claim. Defendants
respond that the language of both Gingles
and Section 2 allows for other types of
legislative districts, such as coalition,
crossover, and influence districts. House
District 18, which defendants term an
"effective minority district," functions as a
single-member crossover district in which
the total African-American voting age
population of 39.36 percent needs to draw
votes from a Caucasian majority to elect the
candidate of its choice. Defendants contend
such a crossover district is permitted by
Section 2 and Gingles.
Our analysis leads us to the conclusion that
plaintiffs' position is both more logical and
more readily applicable in practice. As noted
above, while Gingles addresses multi-
member districts, its analysis also applies to
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single-member districts. De Grandy, 512
U.S. at 1006-07. The first Gingles
precondition is premised on initial proof that
a single-member district could be
constructed with a majority of minority
voters. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17. Gingles
further states that the single-member district
"is generally the appropriate standard
against which to measure minority group
potential to elect" candidates in a multi-
member district. Id. In light of Gingles' use
of a numerical majority of a minority
group's voters to calibrate the minority's
ability to elect its candidate in a multi-
member district, we see no reason to use a
quantity less than a numerical majority as
the determinant in a single-member district.
See Hastert v. State Bd. of Elections, 777 F.
Supp. 634, 654 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
When a minority group lacks a numerical
majority in a district, "the ability to elect
candidates of their own choice was never
within the [minority group's] grasp." Hall v.
Virginia 385 F.3d 421, 430 (4th Cir. 2004).
If a minority group lacks the voting
population "to independently decide the
outcome of an election," it cannot
demonstrate that its voting strength has been
diluted in violation of Section 2 because it
cannot show that any electoral structure or
practice has thwarted its ability or potential
to elect candidates of its choice. Id. at 429.
"Unless minority voters possess the
potential to elect representatives in the
absence of the challenged structure or
practice, they cannot claim to have been
injured by [a vote-diluting] structure or
practice." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 n.17.
Several federal cases have described this
interpretation as imposing a "bright line
rule." See McNeil, 851 F.2d at 944 (the
Gingles preconditions can be viewed as a
"brightline requirement" that the minority
voters make up the majority of the district).
This bright line rule, requiring a minority
group that otherwise meets the Gingles
preconditions to constitute a numerical
majority of citizens of voting age, can be
applied fairly, equally, and consistently
throughout the redistricting process. With a
straightforward and easily administered
standard, Section 2 legislative districts will
be more uniform and less susceptible to
ephemeral political voting patterns,
transitory population shifts, and
questionable predictions of future voting
trends. A bright line rule for the first Gingles
precondition "promotes ease of application
without distorting the statute or the intent
underlying it." McNeil, 851 F.2d at 942.
In addition, a bright line rule provides our
General Assembly a safe harbor for the
redistricting process. Redistricting should be
a legislative responsibility for the General
Assembly, not a legal process for the courts.
Without a majority requirement, each
legislative district is exposed to a potential
legal challenge by a numerically modest
minority group with claims that its voting
power has been diluted and that a district
therefore must be configured to give it
control over the election of candidates. In
such a case, courts would be asked to decide
just how small a minority population can be
and still claim that Section 2 mandates the
drawing of a legislative district to prevent
vote dilution. "[A]n unrestricted breach of
this precondition 'w[ould] likely open a
Pandora's box of marginal Voting Rights
Act claims by minority groups of all sizes."'
Dillard, 376 F.3d at 1268. "The first Gingles
precondition provides a gate-keeping
mechanism by which the courts maintain"
ascertainable and objective standards from
which to adjudicate Section 2 claims. Id.
Although we acknowledge that a bright line
rule "might conceivably foreclose a
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meritorious claim," in general it "ensure[s]
that violations for which an effective remedy
exists will be considered while appropriately
closing the courthouse to marginal claims."
McNeil, 851 F.2d at 943. "In making that
trade-off, the Gingles majority justifiably
sacrificed some claims to protect stronger
claims and promote judicial economy." Id.
Besides the advantages of a bright line rule
requiring a minority group to have a
numerical majority of citizens of voting age,
we are also advertent to the disadvantages of
coalition, crossover, and influence districts.
Without a rule requiring a numerical
majority of citizens of voting age, "there
appears to be no logical or objective
measure for establishing a threshold
minority group size necessary" for Section 2
legislative districts. Hastert, 777 F. Supp. at
654. In addition, courts could be called upon
to divine whether coalitions would hold
together through biennial and quadrennial
election cycles, whether a majority group
would continue to cross over through the
election cycles, whether one minority group
would consistently support another minority
group's primary election candidate, what
percentage of a minority group would vote
with or against that minority, whether the
claims of one minority group are superior to
those of another minority group, and so on.
We do not believe the political process is
enhanced if the power of the courts is
consistently invoked to second-guess the
General Assembly's redistricting decisions.
We also recognize a specific tension in the
Gingles preconditions if crossover districts
are permitted to satisfy Section 2
requirements. A crossover district is
premised upon a minority group gaining
support from voters in the typically
Caucasian majority to elect the candidate of
the minority group's choice. In apparent
contradiction, the third Gingles precondition
requires that the majority population vote
"sufficiently as a bloc to enable it . . .
usually to defeat the minority's preferred
candidate." Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51.
Consequently, if the majority group does not
vote sufficiently as a bloc, the third Gingles
prong cannot be met. When a minority
group is able to accumulate sufficient
crossover Caucasian votes that the minority
candidate is successful, however, the
Gingles premise that the Caucasian majority
votes as a bloc to defeat the minority
group's candidate is undermined. Metts, 363
F.3d at 12 (recognizing the "tension" in "any
effort to satisfy both the first and third prong
of Gingles," and observing that "[t]o the
extent that African-American voters have to
rely on cross-over voting to prove they have
the 'ability to elect' a candidate of their
choosing, their argument that the majority
votes as a bloc against their preferred
candidate is undercut"). In short, a high
level of crossover voting is inconsistent with
the majority bloc voting defined in the third
Gingles precondition and weakens the
possibility of vote dilution. See id. at 13-14
(Selya, J., dissenting) (contending that a
showing of majority bloc voting is
"structurally inconsistent" with a crossover
district).
Thus, after taking into account the language
of Gingles, the weight of persuasive
authority from the federal circuits, the
importance of imposing a practicable rule,
the necessity for judicial economy, the
redistricting responsibility of the General
Assembly, and the inherent tension lurking
in the third Gingles prong, we conclude that
a bright line rule is appropriate.
Accordingly, if a minority group is
geographically compact but nevertheless
lacks a numerical majority of citizens of
voting age, the minority group lacks the
power to decide independently the outcome
of an election, and its voting power has not
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been diluted by the lack of a legislative
district. In such a case, the first Gingles
precondition has not been satisfied and the
General Assembly is not required to create a
Section 2 legislative district.
As presently drawn, House District 18 does
not meet this bright line test. The district has
a total African-American population of
42.89 percent, and an African-American
voting age population of 39.36 percent.
Although the record does not reveal the
number of voting-age African-Americans
who are citizens, that number cannot exceed
the total minority voting age population.
Because the African-American minority
group in House District 18 does not
constitute a numerical majority of citizens of
voting age, House District 18 does not meet
the first Gingles precondition and its current
configuration is not mandated by Section 2
of the VRA.
Although we leave to the General Assembly
the drawing of either House District 18 or
the surrounding districts in Pender, New
Hanover, and other counties in the vicinity,
we direct that all redistricting plans for the
North Carolina House of Representatives
and North Carolina Senate comply with the
principal holding of this case: in order for a
minority group to satisfy the first Gingles
precondition and be "sufficiently large and
geographically compact to constitute a
majority in a single-member district," 478
U.S. at 50, it must constitute a numerical
majority of citizens of voting age. Any
legislative district designated as a Section 2
district under the current redistricting plans,
and any future plans, must either satisfy the
numerical majority requirement as defined
herein, or be redrawn in compliance with the
Whole County Provision of the Constitution
of North Carolina and with Stephenson I
requirements.
REVERSED.
PARKER, ChiefJustice, dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. In my view the
General Assembly had a sound legal basis
for concluding that the configuration of
North Carolina House District 18 in the
2003 House Plan was necessary to comply
with Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.
Accordingly, for the reasons discussed
herein, I would affirm the decision of the
three-judge panel upholding the division of
Pender County.
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act forbids
any "voting qualification or prerequisite to
voting or standard, practice or procedure ...
which results in a denial or abridgment of
the right of any citizen of the United States
to vote on account of race or color." 42
U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000). A State is in
violation of Section 2
if, based on the totality of
circumstances, it is shown that the
political processes leading to
nomination or election in the State
or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by
members of a class of citizens
protected by subsection (a) of this
section in that its members have
less opportunity than other
members of the electorate to
participate in the political process
and to elect representatives of
their choice.
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Id. § 1973(b) (2000).
In construing the totality of circumstances
test, the United States Supreme Court in
Gingles relied upon the Senate Report
accompanying the 1982 VRA Amendments,
stating, "the Committee determined that the
question whether the political processes are
'equally open' depends upon a searching
practical evaluation of the past and present
reality, and on a functional view of the
political process." Thornburg v. Gingles,
478 U.S. 30 (1986). In providing structure to
the totality of circumstances inquiry, the
Court in Gingles enumerated three threshold
factors for establishing vote dilution as
follows:
First, the minority group must be
able to demonstrate that it is
sufficiently large and
geographically compact to
constitute a majority in a single-
member district....
Second, the minority group must
be able to show that it is
politically cohesive. . . . Third, the
minority must be able to
demonstrate that the white
majority votes sufficiently as a
bloc to enable it . . . to defeat the
minority's preferred candidate.
Id. at 50-51.
With respect to whether a minority group is
sufficiently large to "constitute a majority,"
the Court in Gingles disclaimed mechanical
application of the first precondition by
stating:
We have no occasion to consider
whether § 2 permits, and if it does,
what standards should pertain to, a
claim brought by a minority
group, that is not sufficiently large
and compact to constitute a
majority in a single-member
district, alleging that the use of a
multimember district impairs its
ability to influence elections.
Id. at 46 n.12. Thus, the Court declined to
address whether the first threshold
requirement could extend to a group that
constitutes a sufficiently large minority to
elect the candidate of its choice with the
assistance of limited, yet predictable,
crossover votes from the white majority.
In her concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor
rejected the distinction between a Section 2
claim in which the minority constitutes a
numerical majority in a district and a
Section 2 claim when the minority group,
though not a majority in the proposed
district, has the ability to elect its candidate
of choice with the assistance of limited
crossover support from white voters, stating:
I note, however, the artificiality of
the Court's distinction between
claims that a minority group's
"ability to elect the representatives
of [its] choice" has been impaired
and claims that "its ability to
influence elections" has been
impaired. . . . [T]he Court
recognizes that when the
candidates preferred by a minority
group are elected in a
multimember district, the minority
group has elected those
candidates, even if white support
was indispensable to these
victories. On the same reasoning,
if a minority group that is not
large enough to constitute a voting
majority in a single-member
district can show that white
support would probably be
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forthcoming in some such district
to an extent that would enable the
election of the candidates its
members prefer, that minority
group would appear to have
demonstrated that, at least under
this measure of its voting strength,
it would be able to elect some
candidates of its choice.
Id. at 90 n.1, 92 L. Ed. 2d at 72 n.1
(O'Connor, J., Burger, C.J., Powell &
Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
In subsequent cases, the United States
Supreme Court has not endorsed a bright
line requirement that a minority group
seeking Section 2 VRA relief constitute a
numerical majority. In fact, despite having
the opportunity to do so, the Court has
repeatedly declined to close the door on the
issue. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S.
997, 1008-09 (1994) (in which the Court
declined to hold that plaintiffs could not
make a VRA claim based on influence
districts); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S.
146, 154 (1993) (in which the Court
declined to address whether a
reapportionment commission's failure to
create influence districts resulted in a
Section 2 violation); Growe v. Emison, 507
U.S. 25, 41 (1993) (in which the Court
declined to decide if plaintiffs could argue
influence dilution in addition to vote dilution
when the Gingles test was not satisfied).
Moreover, the Supreme Court has continued
to caution lower courts against applying
Gingles to impose a rigid numerical majority
requirement. In Voinovich, the Supreme
Court explained that the Gingles factors
"cannot be applied mechanically and
without regard to the nature of the claim."
507 U.S. at 158. Justice O'Connor noted that
the first Gingles requirement would have to
be "modified or eliminated" when the Court
considered cases in which black voters are
denied "the possibility of being a
sufficiently large minority to elect their
candidate of choice with the assistance of
cross-over votes from the white majority."
Id.
Recently, in League of United Latin
American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399
(2006), the Supreme Court was confronted
with the issue presented in this case. In the
plurality opinion of Justice Kennedy, Part
IV addressed the first Gingles threshold
condition by assuming, as the Court had
done in the past, that it is possible for a
minority group that makes up less than fifty
percent of the district's population to state a
claim under Section 2. Id. at 2624. Justice
Kennedy concluded that under this
assumption, the racial minority "must show
they constitute a sufficiently large minority
to elect their candidate of choice with the
assistance of cross-over votes." Id. at 2624.
Although the Court concluded that no
Section 2 violation occurred, the Court did
so based on its determination that the
evidence did not show that black voters
could elect a candidate of their choice, even
with crossover voting.
Justice Souter, in a separate opinion joined
by Justice Ginsberg, dissented from Part IV,
in which the plurality upheld the trial court's
ruling that no Section 2 violation of the
VRA occurred. Id. at 2648. Justice Souter
concluded that "[a]lthough both the plurality
today and our own prior cases have
sidestepped the question whether a statutory
dilution claim can prevail without the
possibility of a district percentage of
minority voters above 50%, the day has
come to answer it." Id. at 2648. Justice
Souter would have returned the Section 2
VRA claim to the district court for
reconsideration "untethered by the 50%
barrier." Id. at 2651. Justice Stevens, in his
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dissenting opinion, stated, "I agree with
Justice Souter that the '50% rule,' which
finds no support in the text, history, or
purposes of § 2, is not a proper part of the
statutory vote dilution inquiry." Id. at 2645
n. 16.
In North Carolina's legislative elections, a
clear pattern exists which demonstrates the
level of minority presence necessary to give
minority voters an opportunity to elect their
preferred candidates. Prior voting patterns
reveal that house districts in North Carolina
having total black population percentages of
41.54% and above and black voting age
population percentages of 3 8.37% and above
provide an effective opportunity to elect
black candidates. The record shows that the
General Assembly considered the most
relevant indicator of black voting strength to
be black Democratic voter registration;
districts where such registration exceeds
fifty percent consistently elect black
representatives.
In this case, the minority concentration in
House District 18 in the 2003 Plan consisted
of a total black population of 42.89%, a
black voting age population of 39.36%, and
a black Democratic voter registration of
53.72%. In House District 18, election
results have already established that
minority voters have the potential to elect a
representative of choice. The 2004 election
results, held under the 2003 plan,
demonstrated that District 18 as currently
drawn is an effective minority voting district
in which the minority voters' preferred
candidate was re-elected. Unquestionably, a
black candidate can be elected in House
District 18, notwithstanding that the number
of minority voters in the district is less than
fifty percent.
Altering the district to further reduce the
minority population would result in dilution
of a distinctive minority vote. In Hall, the
court found that a minority group's voting
strength is measured in terms of the group's
"ability to elect candidates to public office."
385 F.3d at 427. However, minority voters
who do not form a numerical majority in a
district but who can elect their candidate of
choice with a limited number of crossover
votes do, indeed, have the "ability to elect."
Taking this predictable measure away from
minorities leaves them with "less
opportunity than other members of the
electorate ... to elect representatives of their
choice." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b).
The three-judge panel reviewed the existing
law and correctly declined to follow a rigid
test requiring an absolute numerical majority
of minority voters in a single-member
district. The panel instead took a functional
approach and found that the proper factual
inquiry in analyzing a "coalition" or an
"ability to elect district" is not whether black
voters make up the numerical majority of
voters in a single-member district, but
whether "the political realities of the district,
such as the political affiliation and number
of black registered voters when combined
with other relevant factors" operate to allow
black voters to elect their candidate of
choice. Such an inquiry must focus on the
potential of black voters to elect their
preferred candidates, not merely on raw
numbers alone.
Recent United States Supreme Court
opinions suggest that the application of a
numerical majority requirement without
respect to attendant political circumstances
is not the appropriate test of the merits of a
Section 2 Voting Rights Act claim. Nowhere
in the language of Section 2 is there a
requirement that a district must include a
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population of more than fifty percent of
minority voters in order for a petitioner to
state a claim for relief under Section 2.
Rather, the "totality of circumstances"
language mandates a flexible standard based
on political realities of the district and
supports creation of a district in which the
minority group has the ability to elect a
representative of choice with crossover
support from voters of other racial or ethnic
groups.
Under this Court's prior rulings, the General
Assembly must meet the requirements of
federal law before adhering to the Whole
County Provisions in Article II, Section 3,
Clause 3 and Section 5, Clause 3 of the
North Carolina Constitution. See Stephenson
I, 355 N.C. at 381-82, 562 S.E.2d at 396-97.
In drawing House District 18 in Pender and
New Hanover Counties, the General
Assembly sought to maintain an effective
minority district to comply with Section 2 of
the VRA and to comply with the WCP to the
maximum extent possible. Following the
principles this Court established in the
Stephenson v. Bartlett cases, the three-judge
panel properly concluded that no county,
including Pender County, is guaranteed
protection from being divided based on the
WCP of our State Constitution when the
division of counties is necessary to comply
with the Voting Rights Act.
House District 18, as presently drawn,
contains a black voting age population that
is "sufficiently large and geographically
compact" to elect its candidate of choice,
Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 and the General
Assembly drew House District 18 to comply
with the North Carolina Constitution to the
maximum extent possible.
For the forgoing reasons, I would vote to
affirm the decision of the three-judge panel.
Justice TIMMONS-GOODSON joins in this
dissenting opinion.
TIMMONS -GOODSON, Justice, dissenting:
I join the Chief Justice's dissent.
Furthermore, I write separately to express
my concern that in overriding our
legislature's decisions in order to impose a
bright-line rule, the majority has given
insufficient deference to the legislature's
considered judgment. As the Supreme Court
of the United States has stated, "The
function of the legislature is primary, its
exercises fortified by presumptions of right
and legality, and is not to be interfered with
lightly, nor by any judicial conception of
their wisdom or propriety." Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910). "'[I]n a
democratic society legislatures, not courts,
are constituted to respond to the will and
consequently the moral values of the
people."' Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
175-76.
Since the majority's calculus does not
appear to appropriately factor in the
legislature's role in the districting process,
and the deference due it, I respectfully
dissent.
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"Racial Makeup of 'Influence' Districts
to Be Basis of Case"
Winston-Salem Journal
March 18, 2008
The Associated Press
RALEIGH-The U.S. Supreme Court said
yesterday that it will consider whether
legislative and congressional districts
designed to help minority candidates win
office must do so by containing a majority
of minority voters.
The case could decide the fate of so-called
"influence" districts, drawn in North
Carolina and some other states after the
2000 census in areas where minority
populations are mostly in the 40- to 50-
percent range.
Such districts are preferred by civil-rights
leaders, who worry that creating districts
with a majority of minority voters forces
legislators to pack minority voters into a
smaller overall number of districts, reducing
their overall voting strength.
A Supreme Court ruling on the legality of
"influence" districts is likely to affect how
voting boundaries are drawn after the 2010
Census.
"It strikes me as having far reaching
implications for other states," said Tim
Storey, a redistricting expert at the National
Conference of State Legislatures. "This
really could be the blockbuster case of the
decade."
The case is based on the General
Assembly's decision in 2003 to split the
state's 18th House District between portions
of Pender and New Hanover counties.
Democratic legislators who pushed
influence districts said that the racial
attitudes of white voters had changed,
allowing black voters-including those in
the new 18th District-to maintain their
power as a voting bloc and elect their
preferred candidate. In the new district,
blacks made up only about 39 percent of the
voting-age population.
Last year, the N.C. Supreme Court ruled that
such racial gerrymandering is only allowed
under the landmark Voting Rights Act if it
creates a district with a numerical majority
of minority voters. The court said that the
ruling aligns with the majority of federal
circuit courts that have taken up the issue,
including the 4th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals that covers North Carolina.
"Majority means what it says," said Trey
Thurman, an attorney representing Pender
County commissioners who originally sued.
The N.C. Supreme Court said that the 18th
District also violated a provision of the state
constitution keeping district boundaries from
crossing county lines. The lawsuit filed by
Pender County and local voters challenged
the district's creation on grounds that all
county residents should be placed in a single
district.
The nation's high court hasn't ruled squarely
on the question of influence districts in
recent years, Storey said. The justices
bypassed it in a 2006 ruling involving Texas
Republicans who changed congressional
boundaries in the middle of this decade.
"We think it's time for the court to resolve
this issue," said Anita Earls, who filed a
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friend-of-the-court brief on behalf of the
National Association for the Advancement
of Colored People and three other Pender
County voters.
Four other states and the League of Women
Voters also asked the U.S. Supreme Court to
intervene in the case.
"Our representative democracy depends on
the people having a voice as to who
represents them," N.C. Attorney General
Roy Cooper said in a prepared statement.
"The U.S. Supreme Court's guidance will be
welcome in this case."
Oral arguments will be held this fall, and a
ruling probably would not arrive until next
year. The case is Bartlett v. Strickland.
92
"Pender Districts Voided"
The Raleigh News & Observer
August 25, 2007
Dan Kane and Ryan Teague Beckwith
The N.C. Supreme Court ordered lawmakers
Friday to revise a nearly four-year-old
election map for state House districts after
ruling that Pender County was improperly
carved up among two House districts.
In a 4-2 decision, the court said that
lawmakers violated a provision in the state
constitution intended to keep counties from
being broken up among multiple legislative
districts. The provision is meant to ensure
that counties have more of a voice in the
state legislature.
Pender County had sued to overturn the
redistricting, but it gave up the fight after a
lower court sided with the legislature. Then,
two former county commissioners and a
current one continued the legal battle and
won at the state's highest court.
"Now, everybody in the county will have
one legislator speaking for them," said Trey
Thurman, a former Pender County lawyer
who represented the former and current
commissioners.
It's not clear whether the decision will shake
up many House districts or just lead to some
tweaking in and around Pender County in
southeastern North Carolina. Changing the
dynamics of one district can sometimes
create a domino effect.
"Anytime that you mess with the numbers
you impact a greater area," said Gary
Bartlett, the State Board of Elections
director. "So I think . . . it should impact
some of those local areas."
Lawmakers had generally abided
whole county provision after
redistricting plans were overturned
courts.
by the
earlier
by the
In the latest decision, the Supreme Court
said that lawmakers would not have to
address the issue until the 2010 elections.
That could mean the court order would
affect only one election, because lawmakers
will have to come up with a new
redistricting plan for the entire state for the
2012 election after the next census.
Pender County was split among two districts
so lawmakers could create another House
district that was more likely to elect a black
representative. The federal Voting Rights
Act, which supersedes the state constitution,
requires states to come up with election
districts that do not dilute minority voting
power.
The suit centered on House District 18,
which takes in roughly two-thirds of Pender
County and a northern slice of New Hanover
County. Its registered voters are majority
Democrat and 35 percent black.
Voters have elected Rep. Thomas Wright, a
Wilmington Democrat who is black, to the
district in the previous two elections.
The court found that Wright's district did
not meet the requirements of the Voting
Rights Act, because it does not have a
majority black population. Therefore
lawmakers had to follow the whole county
provision.
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Chief Supreme Court Justice Sarah Parker
and Justice Patricia Timmons-Goodson
dissented from the decision, written by
Justice Robert H. Edmunds Jr. Justice Robin
Hudson did not take part.
Anita Earls, director of advocacy for the
Center for Civil Rights, said the decision
could affect some rural counties with
significant minority populations after the
2010 redistricting.
Because the case centers on the state court's
interpretation of a federal law, Earls said, it
could be appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court, which has not yet ruled on that
particular issue.
"It's possible for minority voters to be
empowered and to elect candidates of their
choice even if they're less than 50 percent of
a district," she said. "They can often win in
districts that are 40 or 45 percent African-
American."
Dr. William J. Barber, president of the North
Carolina NAACP, contended that the state
should appeal the case to the U.S. Supreme
Court. He said that given the history of the
area, including the Wilmington race riots of
1898, the state should take a more active
role in empowering minority voters in the
region.
"We believe that those counties should have
been covered under the Voting Rights Act in
the first place," he said.
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"Pender County Will Sue over
New House Districts"
Wilmington Star-News
December 2, 2003
Sam Scott
They feel their voice in Raleigh is about to
be taken away. And the Pender County
Board of Commissioners plan on making
some noise about that.
The board voted Monday to sue to overturn
recently unveiled state House districts that
would halve Pender County, tying either
side to New Hanover County precincts with
twice their population.
Worried about losing influence in Raleigh,
the county will argue that the split violates a
provision of the state constitution requiring
legislative districts to respect county lines as
much as possible, said Trey Thurman,
Pender County's attorney.
And the county rejects claims that one of the
new districts bolsters minority-voting
power. There is a lower percentage of black
residents in the new district than the current
one, Mr. Thurman said.
"This is simply good old political
gerrymandering," said Mr. Thurman, who
called the suit a winnable case, but far from
a "slam dunk."
With several trips to Raleigh, the
commissioners had lobbied the General
Assembly hard to preserve the essence of
last year's court-ordered plan, which
occurred after a similar legal challenge.
That interim plan created a House district
composed of all of Pender and a section of
northeast New Hanover County. Former
Pender County Commissioner Carolyn
Justice won the seat, becoming the county's
first resident representative in decades.
Her first bill was to toughen the county's
subdivision definition, something the county
had been unable to do when it had no
resident representative.
Under the new plan, Pender's lot is
substantially better than in years past. The
county remains whole within a three-county
Senate district and is only spilt twice
between two counties in the House.
Traditionally, the county has been carved
into inconsequential portions of several
districts. Last year, a redistricting plan
overturned by the N.C. Supreme Court
would have divided the county into eight
House and Senate districts, which
themselves spread over 14 counties.
But the board members still feel they've
taken a major step backward from having a
unified county.
Commissioner David Williams called the
new map a "travesty" for Pender County,
denying it the chance to elect its own
representative. In both districts, New
Hanover County has more than 20,000
residents more than Pender County.
"Essentially we're back to no voice again,"
said Commissioner F.D. Rivenbark.
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"Voting Act Overshadows Race Debate"
Boston Globe
July 31, 2006
Joseph Williams
PETERSBURG, Va.-Andrew's Grill is a
clear throwback to the 1960s. The worn
lunch counter has leatherette stools, each
booth has an ashtray, and stick-to-your-ribs
favorites fill the menu: double
cheeseburgers, cheese omelets, and
scrambled eggs with a side of smokehouse
bacon.
But the mostly black, working-class
clientele of the bustling diner, and the city
itself, are squarely atop a modern political
fault line. Here, a historic 42-year-old law
guaranteeing African-Americans the right to
vote grinds against present-day fights over
political power.
There were celebrations last week when
President Bush renewed key provisions of
the Voting Rights Act of 1964, which
eliminated segregation at the ballot box. The
act helped form political districts where
black voters are in the majority, which sent
the first wave of African-American
representatives to Congress since
Reconstruction-and creating, over time,
loyal Democratic voters.
But the renewal overshadowed a quiet but
growing debate among Democrats: whether
mostly black voting districts in cities like
Petersburg-which helped elect the state's
first African-American House member in
more than 100 years-should be diluted to
spread around liberal voters and help elect
more Democrats get to Congress.
While most black politicians and activists
agree with the concept of "majority-
minority" districts, others say they're a
mixed blessing: By sweeping a concentrated
number of black voters into fewer districts,
the Voting Rights Act's unintended effect
may be to increase racial polarization and
help preserve Republican congressional
power.
And like most debates involving race, few
want to debate it openly.
"It's one of those things that are just sort of
acknowledged," said David Bositis , a senior
analyst at the Joint Center for Political and
Economic Studies who specializes in race
and politics, referring to the idea that
majority-minority districts may have helped
Republicans.
In redrawing districts in states where their
party is in power, Republicans have used the
Voting Rights Act as cover to "pack and
stack" black voters, Bositis said, cramming
them into fewer districts.
Some Democrats, including some African-
Americans, believe their party has better
odds of retaking Congress if African-
American voters are divided among many
districts, leaving just enough of a percentage
in any one district to elect minority
candidates while helping more Democrats
run competitively in surrounding districts.
His quotations in The Washington Post
raised eyebrows among some in the
Congressional Black Caucus. Emanuel did
not return phone calls from the Globe.
Representative Julia Carson of Indiana, who
is black, recently won a fifth term from her
Indianapolis-based district, which is 63
percent white, but she rejects Emanuel's
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assertion. "I think if anything, we need to
enhance" the number of majority-minority
districts to ensure African-Americans are
represented in Congress, noting that blacks
still lack political power commensurate to
their percentage of the population.
African-Americans represent 12.2 percent of
the U.S. population, but hold 9.7 percent of
House seats and one of the 100 Senate seats.
Nonetheless, some Democrats acknowledge
Emanuel's point.
Watering down so-called "majority-
minority" districts "is being discussed," said
a top aide to a senior Democratic
congressional leader, the only party official
who agreed to speak about the subject on
condition of anonymity. "It's a balancing
act. You want to make sure [minorities]
have a seat at the table" without
concentrating so many in a single district
that would weaken the party elsewhere.
Party leaders, however, can't do much
besides pressure Democrats at the state level
to push for changes in the makeup of House
districts. State legislatures typically redraw
districts once a decade in response to census
data.
Under the Voting Rights Act, states with
egregious histories of racial discrimination,
most in the South, have to get permission
from the Justice Department before they
make any changes to voting laws or districts.
Bositis said legislatures have interpreted the
act as a mandate for majority-minority
districts, "although there is wide flexibility
in the law." Republican-dominated
legislatures try to design districts with the
maximum possible number of minorities-
such as the 2d district of Louisiana, which is
63.7 percent black and elected
Representative William Jefferson
Congress with 79 percent of the vote.
to
Emanuel "may have been criticized, but he
was absolutely correct," said Larry Sabato,
political science professor at the University
of Virginia. "The Democrats have an
enormous number of excess votes in these
majority-minority districts."
But Ron Walters, who teaches political
science at the University of Maryland, said
he disagrees "profoundly" with the idea that
Democrats can have it both ways: win more
seats by diluting majority-minority districts,
yet ensure the election of blacks and
Latinos.
The percentage of minority voters is one
factor in a complex racial equation, he said.
While Carson won in a mostly white district,
it was in a northern state and her last race
was close; meanwhile, Walters said, studies
show Southern whites tend not to cross
racial lines at the ballot box.
Given voting patterns, even a 60 percent
minority district "may not be enough to
win" in some places, he said.
In Petersburg-which the Republican-
controlled state Legislature recently shifted
into a district that elected a conservative
white Republican over a black Democrat-
the debate takes on extra nuance. Located
about 20 miles south of Richmond, the
former Confederate capitol, Petersburg is a
predominantly black city largely defined by
the Civil War: the Confederacy made its last
stand here, and the Union held the city under
siege for nearly a year.
In 1992, Petersburg was in Virginia's 3d
District, which sent Robert Scott, a
Democrat and longtime black state
legislator, to Congress, breaking a century-
old color line.
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Though his district included several heavily
black urban areas, Scott said he didn't need
them to win because he had shown he could
appeal to white voters by winning a state
legislative race in a district that was mostly
white.
"The key isn't the race of the
it's not the 'Candidate Rights
Scott, a seven-term House
Districts should be drawn
community has the opportunity
candidate of their choice."
candidate-
Act,"' said
incumbent.
"so the
to elect the
At Andrew's Grill, between bites of his twin
chili dogs, Robert Myers, who is African-
American, questioned the Democrats'
motives in considering increasing the party's
political power at the expense of black
voters.
"Why would you do that? That's crazy,"
said Myers, 64, a longtime Petersburg
resident. "If you dilute black voting strength,
how can [we] win?"
But Joseph Preston, an African-American
lawyer who is active in local politics, sees
both sides of the issue. He pointed to L.
Douglas Wilder, former governor of
Virginia and the state's first black elected
governor, who won over voters in all areas
of the state-including mostly white, rural
areas as well as cities.
Yet, given the fact that blacks needed a
federal law to end voting discrimination, and
the relative lack of black elected officials,
Preston said it makes sense that African-
Americans wouldn't want to change a
system that helps them choose a
representative "who looks like me."
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"Supreme Court Upholds Texas Redistricting"
Los Angeles Times
June 29, 2006
David G. Savage
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court gave
politicians new legal license Wednesday to
redraw election districts aggressively to
benefit the party in power, as it upheld the
mid-decade redistricting plan engineered by
former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay
and Texas Republicans.
By clever line-drawing, Delay and the Texas
legislature-with both houses newly under
GOP control in 2003-remade its delegation
in Congress, helping turn a 17-15
Democratic majority into a 21-11
Republican majority in 2004.
The bold move signaled an escalation in
partisan warfare. Before, the redrawing of
the electoral districts was a once-a-decade
battle that followed the release of new
census numbers.
Legal experts and political strategists said
Wednesday's ruling will encourage
Republicans in other GOP-dominated states
to redraw their districts to give themselves a
bigger majority.
It is not clear that Democrats will be able to
do the same. In the ruling Wednesday, the
court stressed that the Voting Rights Act
generally forbids splitting up blocs of
minority voters. That makes it harder to
create more Democratic districts.
Mary G. Wilson, president of the League of
Women Voters, called the decision
"extremely disappointing," saying it will
encourage politicians to become serial
mapmakers. "We now can expect an even
more vicious battle between the political
parties as they redraw district lines every
two years for partisan gain," she said.
On Wednesday, a five-member Supreme
Court majority said that DeLay's plan, even
if it were drawn for a purely partisan
purpose, did not violate the Constitution and
its guarantee of equal protection under the
law. But the court did find one district to be
illegally drawn because it diluted Hispanic
voting power. The overall ruling applies to
other electoral districts as well, including
those for state legislatures.
Electoral districts are usually drawn by
politicians in state capitals, the justices
noted, and it is hard to say when such a
politically drawn plan becomes too partisan.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy,
the court, cited two other
upholding the Texas plan.
speaking for
reasons for
First, he said, the task of redistricting
belongs to elected legislators. In 2001, a
panel of federal judges redrew the Texas
districts because the state legislature-then
divided between a Republican Senate and a
Democratic House-could not agree on a
plan. So the plan pressed by Delay in 2003
was the first to win the approval of the
state's elected legislators.
"'There is nothing inherently suspect about a
legislature's decision to replace mid-decade
a court-ordered plan with one of its own,"
Kennedy said.
Second, he said, it is not clear that the GOP-
friendly plan drawn by DeLay was less fair
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than the Democratic-friendly plan it
replaced.
Prior to 2003, Democratic leaders had used
their power in Austin to preserve a
Democratic majority in the state's
congressional delegation, even as most
Texans voted for Republicans. Four years
ago, 59 percent of Texans voted Republican
and 41 percent Democratic in statewide
tallies, yet more Democrats than
Republicans won election to the House of
Representatives. By this measure, DeLay's
plan "can be seen as fairer" than the one it
replaced, Kennedy said.
The court's four conservatives-Chief
Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and Justices
Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and
Samuel A. Alito Jr.-joined Kennedy in
rejecting the charge of "partisan
gerrymandering" against the Texans
Republicans.
At the same time, Kennedy joined with the
four liberal justices-John Paul Stevens,
David H. Souter, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
Stephen G. Breyer-to rule that one south
Texas district was drawn illegally in a way
that hurt Hispanic voters.
The Voting Rights Act of 1982 forbids
officials from "diluting" the power of
minority voting blocs, and Kennedy said
Texas lawmakers violated that provision
when they shifted 100,000 Hispanic voters
to shore up the re-election prospects of Rep.
Henry Bonilla, a Republican who is
unpopular with Hispanic voters.
The Texas legislature split Webb County,
which is 94 percent Hispanic, between
Bonilla's 23rd District and a neighboring
district.
This ruling will require the Texas
legislature, or perhaps a panel of judges, to
redraw that district-which will force others
to be changed.
Ken Mehlman, chairman of the Republican
National Committee, called the ruling "a
victory for Texas voters and the Republican
Party." He added that it "confirmed that the
current Texas map is fair under any
standard."
A lawyer for the Texas Democrats said he
was dismayed the court had turned a blind
eye to an "extreme example . . . of raw
partisan politics." J. Gerald Hebert, a
Washington lawyer, said the decision "opens
the floodgate for partisan redistricting. The
court has essentially ceded the field . . . and
state legislatures have largely been given a
free hand to do what they will with
congressional districts."
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"The Supreme Court: Voting Rights"
The New York Times
June 27, 2004
Adam Clymer
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court
endorsed a new approach to racial
redistricting today by holding that when
states draw new legislative boundaries they
may consider overall minority influence in
the political process, not just the number of
minority voters in a given district.
The 5-to-4 ruling also endorsed a tactic
Democrats employed in several states-
including Georgia, Alabama, North Carolina
and New Jersey-after the 2000 census
when they sought to put substantial numbers
of black voters in districts where they could
shore up white Democrats.
Republicans fought them, seeking to
concentrate black Democratic voters in
fewer districts. They argued that districts
with big black majorities were essential to
comply with the Voting Rights Act.
The Voting Rights Act, passed in 1965,
prohibited states from denying the vote to
people on the basis of race or color. Literacy
tests, which had been widely used to deny
Southern blacks the vote, were banned.
Southern states that sought to change any
laws relating to voting, including those on
registration hours and maps of legislative or
Congressional districts, were required to
clear them with the Justice Department or a
federal court in Washington. In recent years,
most litigation over the act has involved
redistricting.
Though the Supreme Court never took that
position, the Justice Department contended
in the 1990 round of redistricting that any
reduction in the percentage of minority
voters in a district amounted to an
impermissible "retrogression," or reduction,
of minority voting rights. In states where
that argument prevailed, more black
candidates were elected, but Democrats lost
seats overall because they lost reliable black
Democrats from districts with white
majorities.
Today's decision, written by Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor, amounted to a refinement of
the definition of retrogression, holding that a
balancing of factors, not just the number of
minority voters in a given district, was
necessary to judge a plan.
While the decision turned on the vote of a
single justice, there appeared to be broad
agreement in both camps that the older
standard-that districts had to have
overwhelming black majorities to comply
with the act-was outdated. If states could
show that blacks had a serious chance of
winning in districts where they were less
than a big majority, most justices agreed,
then reducing the size of the black majority
in those districts could still be acceptable.
The case involved a redistricting plan from
Georgia where the legislature had reduced
the number of blacks in three state Senate
districts, but made sure the black population
of voting age in those districts did not fall
below 50 percent. Georgia's attorney
general had argued before the Supreme
Court that although the changes may have
slightly reduced the prospects of black
voters electing a candidate of their
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choice, they increased the prospects of
Democrats who hold positions favorable to
blacks being elected.
Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority in
the case, Georgia v. Ashcroft, said it was
essential for courts to examine the overall
impact of a districting plan, including the
number of "'influence districts,' where
minority voters may not be able to elect a
candidate of choice but can play a
substantial, if not decisive, role in the
process."
"The state may choose," she wrote, "that it
is better to risk having fewer minority
representatives in order to achieve greater
overall representation of a minority group by
increasing the number of representatives
sympathetic to the interests of minority
voters."
Those dissenting from today's ruling, led by
Justice David H. Souter, contended that the
decision was so imprecise that it invited
discriminatory redistricting efforts by
lawmakers who did not have the interests of
minority voters at heart. They argued that in
the case before them the state failed to show
that blacks' voting power would not be
diminished. Justice Souter wrote that the
decision meant "there will simply be greater
opportunity to reduce minority voting
strength in the guise of obtaining party
advantage."
The majority did not say whether the plan
Georgia Democrats pushed through in 1991
was lawful or not. Instead it told the District
Court that had invalidated the plan on a 2-to-
1 vote to re-examine the case and pay more
attention to the views of minority lawmakers
in the state who had endorsed the plan. The
majority also said the appeals court should
consider whether the new scheme might
produce a Democratic majority in the state
Senate and result in blacks' attaining
committee chairmanships.
In addition, the court told the appeals panel
to factor in whether reductions in African-
American percentages in some districts were
offset by gains in others. Whatever the lower
court decides, the case is likely to come
back to the Supreme Court in a few years for
further definition.
Racial redistricting issues have traditionally
divided the court. But Professor David T.
Canon of the University of Wisconsin, a
student of the issue, observed that one
striking thing about today's opinion was that
the same five justices who agreed on the
ruling in 2000 that George W. Bush was
president "were voting with the Democratic
Party against the Bush administration. Race
trumps party on this issue."
Republican Congressional leaders had no
comment. But Representative Martin Frost,
the Texas Democrat who has led his party's
redistricting efforts, praised the decision,
saying it agreed with the Democrats' view
that minority voters could have more power
if they could influence the results in many
districts.
On one crucial point, Justice Souter and the
rest of the minority agreed with the majority.
"Reducing the number of majority-minority
members within a state would not
necessarily amount to retrogression," he
wrote, "if a state can show that a new
districting plan shifts from supermajority
districts, in which candidates can elect their
candidates of choice by their own voting
power, to coalition districts, in which
minorities are in fact shown to have similar
opportunities when joined by predictably
supportive non-minority voters." But he said
the lower court was right in deciding that
Georgia had not met the burden of showing
such opportunities would result.
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LOOKING BACK: CRAWFORD V. MARION COUNTY
ELECTIONS BOARD
"In a 6-to-3 Vote, Justices Uphold a Voter ID Law"
New York Times
April 28, 2008
Linda Greenhouse
WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court
upheld Indiana's voter identification law on
Monday, concluding in a splintered decision
that the challengers failed to prove that the
law's photo ID requirement placed an
unconstitutional burden on the right to vote.
The 6-to-3 ruling kept the door open to
future lawsuits that provided more evidence.
But this theoretical possibility was small
comfort to the dissenters or to critics of
voter ID laws, who predicted that a more
likely outcome than successful lawsuits
would be the spread of measures that would
keep some legitimate would-be voters from
the polls.
Voting experts said the ruling was likely to
complicate election administration, leading
to both more litigation and more legislation,
at least in states with Republican legislative
majorities, but would probably have a
limited impact on this year's presidential
voting.
The issue has been intensely partisan, with
Republicans supporting increased
identification requirements for voters and
Democrats opposing them. In what the court
described as the "lead opinion," which was
written by Justice John Paul Stevens and
joined by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.
and Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the court
acknowledged that the record of the case
contained "no evidence" of the type of voter
fraud the law was ostensibly devised to
detect and deter, the effort by a voter to cast
a ballot in another person's name.
But Justice Stevens said that neither was
there "any concrete evidence of the burden
imposed on voters who now lack photo
identification." The "risk of voter fraud"
was "real," he said, and there was "no
question about the legitimacy or importance
of the state's interest in counting only the
votes of eligible voters."
The three others who made up the majority,
Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas,
and Samuel A. Alito Jr., said in an opinion
by Justice Scalia that the law was so
obviously justified as "a generally
applicable, nondiscriminatory voting
regulation" that there was no basis for
scrutinizing the record to assess the impact
on any individual voters. "This is an area
where the dos and don'ts need to be known
in advance of the election," Justice Scalia
said.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice David H.
Souter said that for those on whom the law
had an impact, the burden was "serious" and
the state had failed to justify it. Like the
Virginia poll tax the court struck down 42
years ago, he said, "the onus of the Indiana
law is illegitimate just because it correlates
with no state interest so well as it does with
the object of deterring poorer residents from
exercising the franchise." The other
dissenters were Justices Ruth Bader
103
elderly and people with disabilities.
Six states in addition to Indiana-Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Louisiana, Michigan, and
South Dakota-now require voters to
provide photo identification before casting a
ballot. Bills are pending in two dozen other
states, although they are not likely to pass
this year in more than a handful, due to short
legislative sessions and Democratic
opposition.
The Indiana law, adopted by the
Republican-controlled legislature in 2005
without a single Democratic vote, is
regarded as the strictest in the country. It
requires a voter to present a photograph as
part of an unexpired document issued either
by Indiana or the federal government, a
requirement that in most cases can be
satisfied only by a current driver's license or
a passport. The state's motor vehicle agency
provides a free photo ID card for people
who do not drive, but obtaining it requires a
"primary document" like an original birth
certificate or a passport.
Would-be voters without proper
identification may cast a provisional ballot
that will be counted only if they appear
within 10 days at a county clerk's office and
present acceptable photo identification or,
alternatively, swear either that they are
indigent or that they have a religious
objection to being photographed.
The Indiana law was challenged in separate
suits filed by the Indiana Democratic Party
and by another group of plaintiffs that
included elected officials and community
groups. The plaintiffs argued that the state
had failed to justify a requirement they said
would place a special burden on thousands
of eligible voters in Indiana who lack
driver's licenses, a group that
disproportionately includes the poor, the
The plaintiffs lost, both in Federal District
Court in Indianapolis and in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, in Chicago. Writing for the 2-to-i
majority at the appeals court, Judge Richard
A. Posner agreed with the plaintiffs that the
law would have the greatest impact on
people who were "low on the economic
ladder and thus, if they do vote, are more
likely to vote for Democratic than
Republican candidates." While that fact
gave the Democratic Party standing to sue,
he said, it did not make the law
unconstitutional.
The suits were filed before the statute took
effect, challenging the law "on its face."
This technique, known as a "facial
challenge," has been a staple of election
litigation, based on the notion that once an
election has taken place, the asserted
damage has been done and it is too late to
make judicial amends.
A debate over the legitimacy of a facial
challenge in the voter ID context did not
enter this case until the Bush administration
filed a brief at the Supreme Court stage
supporting Indiana. Solicitor General Paul
D. Clement told the court in his brief that, as
a facial challenge, the suit was premature
and based on nothing more than
"speculation and as-yet untested evidence."
In the decision on Monday, Crawford v.
Marion County Election Board, No. 07-21,
the Supreme Court did not go quite so far as
to make facial challenges unavailable. But
Justice Stevens said in his opinion that in
their effort to invalidate the statute in all its
applications, the plaintiffs failed to carry
their "heavy burden of persuasion," given
the weight of the state's interest in election
integrity.
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Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer.
In his dissenting opinion, which Justice
Ginsburg also signed, Justice Souter
examined the case from the opposite end of
the telescope. Given that there was "no
evidence of in-person voter impersonation
fraud in a state, and very little of it
nationwide," he said it was Indiana's job to
justify placing even a slight burden on even
a limited number of people. "The interest in
combating voter fraud has too often served
as a cover for unnecessarily restrictive
electoral rules," Justice Souter said.
Justice Breyer, in a separate dissenting
opinion, compared Indiana's law with those
in Georgia and Florida, which also require
photo identification but accept a range of
more broadly accessible documents. Florida
accepts student identification cards,
employee badges and cards from
neighborhood associations, for example, and
accepts a provisional ballot as long as the
voter's signature matches one on file.
Indiana has not justified its "significantly
harsher" requirements, he said.
The vote of Justice Stevens, a reliable
anchor of the court's liberal bloc, was
something of a surprise. Some speculated
that his strategic aim was to keep Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy from
joining the Scalia camp. Edward B. Foley,
an election law expert at Ohio State
University, said the Stevens opinion might
represent an effort to "depoliticize election
law cases."
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"Initial Thoughts on the Supreme Court's
Opinion in Crawford"
Election Law Blog
April 28, 2008
Rick Hansen
Today's much anticipated decision in
Crawford v. Marion County Election Board
is a significant win for those who support
stricter voter identification laws, even if they
support such laws for partisan purposes. It
will encourage further litigation, because it
relegates challenges to laws imposing
onerous burdens on a small group of voters
to "as applied" challenges, but those
challenges will be difficult to win. The lack
of a majority opinion, moreover, injects
some uncertainty into the appropriate
standard for reviewing other challenges to
onerous election laws. The Court's specific
split in this case will blunt charges that this
is a politicized 5-4 decision-and it is
significant that the Court, once again, has
failed to cite to its opinion in Bush v. Gore.
More on each of these points below.
[Disclosure: I filed a pro bono amicus brief
on my own behalf supporting the
challengers to the law in this case.]
1. The Controlling Standard from Justice
Stevens' Opinion.
The Court split into three camps on the
constitutionality of Indiana's voter
identification law (four camps if you count
the nuanced differences between Justice
Souter's and Justice Breyer's dissenting
opinions). The controlling opinion is that of
Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Kennedy. In a nutshell,
the approach boils down to this: under the
balancing approach of earlier cases (which
the opinion says comes from cases such as
Anderson and Burdick), a state needs to
come forward with merely plausible non-
discriminatory interests to justify an election
law. The evidence need not be strong.
Indeed, though Justice Stevens says that
there is evidence of fraud to justify a voter
identification requirement, the actual
evidence he cites in the footnotes is
incredibly thin-either reaching back to
1868 (footnote 11) or a single case of
impersonation voter fraud found in a recent
gubernatorial election in Washington state
(fn. 12). Moreover, Justice Stevens says an
interest in preserving voter confidence can
justify such laws as well, ignoring
undisputed evidence such laws are not at all
likely to instill voter confidence (and could
in fact do the opposite). Nor does it matter if
the motivation in passing the law is
completely partisan. The law is to be upheld
unless "such considerations had provided
the only justification for a photo
identification requirement." So those with
partisan motive need only find a nonpartisan
pretext for such laws. Once the state has
posited its neutral reasons for such a law, the
law is to be upheld if it doesn't impose
serious burdens on most voters. For those
voters who do face serious burdens, they
must bring an "as applied" challenge where
they present specific evidence applied to
them as to why the law is onerous. This
channelling of election law cases into as
applied challenges-part of a recent trend of
the Court-is going to make it tough for a
lot of plaintiffs who are burdened, and is in
sharp contrast with the Court's approach in
earlier cases, such as the Harper case
striking down the poll tax for everyone, not
just poor voters. The evidence in as-applied
challenges must be specific and tested in
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litigation; as Justice Stevens says responding
to Justice Souter's dissent: "Supposition
based on extensive Internet research is not
an adequate substitute for admissible
evidence subject to cross-examination in
constitutional adjudication.
2. The Wide Gap in the Other Opinions.
Justice Scalia's opinion (joined by Justices
Alito and Thomas) concurring in the
judgment is uncharacteristically brief. It
reads the applicable constitutional standard
differently, one that simply gives carte
blanche to most states to pass laws with any
kind of neutral justification offered. It is
unclear to me, despite the footnote, whether
Justice Scalia would today uphold a poll tax
like that struck down by the Court in
Harper. Certainly Justice Scalia seems to
think that if a law doesn't burden most
people, it should be upheld unless it imposes
a "severe and overall" burden on the right to
vote. Justice Souter's opinion in dissent is
the one I would have hoped the Court would
have written; rather than accepting the
state's interests at face value, it probed to
see if the evidence actually supported it.
Because the state failed to do so, the Court
should have struck down the law entirely,
not relegated future challenges to "as
applied" litigation. Justice Breyer, taking a
somewhat more moderate approach to the
state's interest, finds fault in the details of
the Indiana plan-there is no justification,
he says, for the more severe aspects of the
plan.
3. The Split on the Court and the Legacy
of Bush v. Gore.
Certainly the potentially explosive nature of
this litigation is blunted by the Court's
interesting split in the case. This is not your
typical 5-4 split with Justice Kennedy
casting the deciding vote. The controlling
opinion features three Justices across the
spectrum of the Court; that's good news for
those who worried about the effect of this
decision on the Court's legitimacy in
election law cases. Beyond that split, it is
amazing to me how allergic all the Justices
of the Court are to Bush v. Gore. One of the
things I spent considerable time on in my
amicus brief and in a recent Stanford Law
Review article is the rise in partisan
litigation in the courts in the wake of the
2000 Florida debacle and the politicization
even of the Judiciary. Nary a word from any
Justice on what their own handiwork may
have caused in this country. The Stevens
opinion response seems to be one of
showing by example rather than addressing
the issue directly. While that's to be
commended, I am disappointed by how
cursory that opinion was in its review of the
state's interest in light of the highly partisan
atmosphere of election administration, and I
fear that, despite the Stevens-Kennedy-
Roberts' opinion's best intentions, this
opinion will be read as a green light for the
enactment of more partisan election laws in
an attempt to skew outcomes in close
elections. It is a real disappointment from
that perspective.
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"ID Law Keeps Nuns, Students from Polls"
Los Angeles Times
May 7, 2008
Scott Martelle
A dozen nuns and an unknown number of
students were turned away from polls
Tuesday in the first use of Indiana's
stringent voter ID law since it was upheld
last week by the U.S. Supreme Court.
The nuns , all residents of a retirement home
at Saint Mary's Convent near Notre Dame
University, were denied ballots by a fellow
sister and poll worker because the women,
in their 80s and 90s, did not have valid
Indiana photo ID cards.
Though state officials reported no
significant problems, advocates monitoring
polling places said there was occasional
confusion.
"We were at one polling place for a few
hours and picked up three or four different
stories of people being turned away," said
Gary Kalman of the U.S. Public Interest
Research Group in Washington. "I don't
have numbers about how widespread it is."
"It's the law, and it makes it hard," said
Sister Julie McGuire, who was working at
the polling place and had to explain to the
nuns that they could not vote. "Some don't
understand why."
Indiana requires voters who come to the
polls show a photo ID issued by the state or
the federal government. The law was
pressed by Republicans citing voter fraud
and opposed by Democrats and the ACLU,
who argued that it would disenfranchise
voters.
The law does not recognize out-of-state
driver's licenses, a problem for college
students who under Indiana law must intend
to live in their college communities to vote,
which involves obtaining an Indiana ID.
Angela Hiss, 19, of suburban Chicago, said
she was allowed to register to vote several
weeks ago but was turned away Tuesday
from a polling site in South Bend, where she
attends Notre Dame. Hiss said officials at a
local motor vehicles office then would not
accept her Illinois license as proof of
identification for an Indiana license.
And Hiss didn't have her
she had sent it to the
Service offices recently
application for a passport.
birth certificate-
federal Passport
along with her
Hiss declined to cast a provisional ballot
because she's leaving for Illinois after finals
on Friday.
But she can add her story to family lore that
includes her aunt's going to a Chicago
polling site years ago and being told that her
mother had voted earlier that day.
"She said, 'My mother's dead,"' Hiss said.
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"Voter ID Battle Shifts to Proof of Citizenship"
New York Times
May 12, 2008
Ian Urbina
The battle over voting rights will expand
this week as lawmakers in Missouri are
expected to support a proposed
constitutional amendment to enable election
officials to require proof of citizenship from
anyone registering to vote.
The measure would allow far more rigorous
demands than the voter ID requirement
recently upheld by the Supreme Court, in
which voters had to prove their identity with
a government-issued card.
Sponsors of the amendment-which
requires the approval of voters to go into
effect, possibly in an August referendum-
say it is part of an effort to prevent illegal
immigrants from affecting the political
process. Critics say the measure could lead
to the disenfranchisement of tens of
thousands of legal residents who would find
it difficult to prove their citizenship.
Voting experts say the Missouri amendment
represents the next logical step for those
who have supported stronger voter ID
requirements and the next battleground in
how elections are conducted. Similar
measures requiring proof of citizenship are
being considered in at least 19 state
legislatures. Bills in Florida, Kansas,
Oklahoma and South Carolina have strong
support. But only in Missouri does the
requirement have a chance of taking effect
before the presidential election.
In Arizona, the only state that requires proof
of citizenship to register to vote, more than
38,000 voter registration applications have
been thrown out since the state adopted its
measure in 2004. That number was included
in election data obtained through a lawsuit
filed by voting rights advocates and
provided to The New York Times. More than
70 percent of those registrations came from
people who stated under oath that they were
born in the United States, the data showed.
Already, 25 states, including Missouri,
require some form of identification at the
polls. Seven of those states require or can
request photo ID. More states may soon
decide to require photo ID now that the
Supreme Court has upheld the practice.
Democrats have already criticized these
requirements as implicitly intended to keep
lower-income voters from the polls, and are
likely to fight even more fiercely now that
the requirements are expanding to include
immigration status.
"Three forces are converging on the issue:
security, immigration and election
verification," said Dr. Robert A. Pastor, co-
director of the Center for Democracy and
Election Management at American
University in Washington. This
convergence, he said, partly explains why
such measures are likely to become more
popular and why they will make election
administration, which is already a highly
partisan issue, even more heated and
litigious.
The Missouri secretary of state, Robin
Carnahan, a Democrat who opposes the
measure, estimated that it could
disenfranchise up to 240,000 registered
voters who would be unable to prove their
citizenship.
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In most of the states that require
identification, voters can use utility bills,
paychecks, driver's licenses or student or
military ID cards to prove their identity. In
the Democratic primary election last week in
Indiana, several nuns were denied ballots
because they lacked the required photo IDs.
Measures requiring proof of citizenship raise
the bar higher because they offer fewer
options for documentation. In most cases,
aspiring voters would have to produce an
original birth certificate, naturalization
papers or a passport. Arizona and Missouri,
along with some other states, now show
whether a driver is a citizen on the face of a
driver's license, and within a few years all
states will be required by the federal
government to restrict licenses to legal
residents.
Critics say that when this level of
documentation is applied to voting, it
becomes more difficult for the poor,
disabled, elderly and minorities to
participate in the political process.
"Everyone has been focusing on voter ID
laws generally, but the most pernicious
measures and the ones that really promise to
prevent the most eligible voters from voting
is what we see in Arizona and now in
Missouri," said Jon Greenbaum, a former
voting rights official at the Department of
Justice and now the director of the voting
rights project at the Lawyers' Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law, a liberal advocacy
group.
Aside from its immediacy, the action by
Missouri is important because it has been a
crucial swing state in recent presidential
elections, with outcomes often decided by a
razor-thin margin.
Supporters of the measures cite growing
concerns that illegal immigrants will try to
vote. They say proof of citizenship measures
are an important way to improve the
accuracy of registration rolls and the overall
voter confidence in the process.
State Representative Stanley Cox, a
Republican from Sedalia and the sponsor of
the amendment, said that the Missouri
Constitution already required voters to be
citizens and that his amendment was simply
meant to better enforce that requirement.
"The requirements we have right now are
totally inadequate," Mr. Cox said. "You can
present a utility bill, and that doesn't prove
anything. I could sit here with my nice
photocopier and create a thousand utility
bills with different names on them."
From October 2002 to September 2005,
Justice Department indicted 40 voters
registration fraud or illegal voting, 21
whom were noncitizens, according
department records.
the
for
of
to
In 2006, the Missouri legislature passed a
photo identification bill that the State
Supreme Court later ruled unconstitutional
because it placed too much of a burden on
voters. It was that ruling that has spurred
state lawmakers to try to change the
constitution.
The proposed amendment does not require
the signature of the governor but would need
to be approved by the voters in the state's
August primary in the governor's race to
take effect before the presidential election.
If passed this week, the amendment clears
the way for a pending bill that would require
some kind of identification in order to prove
citizenship and to register to vote. But many
questions about the bill-like whether
current registered voters will have to obtain
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a new form of identification-have not been
resolved.
Lillie Lewis, a voter who lives in St. Louis
and spoke at a news conference last week
organized to oppose the amendment, said
she already had a difficult time trying to get
a photo ID from the state, which asked her
for a birth certificate. Ms. Lewis, who was
born in Mississippi and said she was 78
years old, said officials of that state sent her
a letter stating that they had no record of her
birth.
"That's downright wrong," Ms. Lewis said.
"I have voted in almost all of the
presidential races going back I can't
remember how long, but if they tell me I
need a passport or birth certificate that'll be
the end of that."
A 2006 federal rule intended to keep illegal
immigrants from receiving Medicaid was
widely criticized by state officials for
shutting out tens of thousands of United
States citizens who were unable to find birth
certificates or other documents proving their
citizenship.
Supporters of citizenship requirements,
however, say the threat of voting by illegal
immigrants is real. Thor Hearne, a lawyer
for the American Center for Voting Rights, a
conservative advocacy group, cited a
California congressional race in 1996 in
which a Republican, Bob Dornan, was
narrowly defeated. Mr. Doman contested the
results, claiming that illegal immigrants had
voted.
After a 14-month investigation by state,
county and federal officials, a panel
concluded that up to 624 noncitizens may
have registered to vote. The report came to
no firm determination of whether any of
those people had actually voted.
Mr. Hearne said the requirement would not
pose a significant hardship on voters.
"There were a lot of the same alarmist
charges regarding Indiana voter ID law and
how it would disenfranchise so many
people," Mr. Hearne said, "and those
allegations were not accepted by the
Supreme Court." He added that if states
actively provided a free form of
identification proving citizenship, the
number of people who would be
disenfranchised would be very low.
"To those who have spent great energy
opposing some of the voter registration or
voter identification requirements, I would
say their energy would be much better spent
working toward trying to provide
identifications to those who need them or
assisting these people with getting
registered," Mr. Hearne said.
But organizations working in Arizona say
they are doing just that and running into
problems.
"The requirement is having a devastating
effect on our voter registration work in
Latino communities because so many
citizens simply don't have a passport or
original birth certificate," said Michael
Slater, deputy director of Project Vote, a
liberal advocacy group that is working with
Acorn, a national organizing group, to sign
up new voters in Arizona.
But Arizona officials say the measure is
broadly popular in the state.
"The voters of Arizona feel strongly about
proof of citizenship when registering to vote
as a basic eligibility requirement," said the
secretary of state, Jan Brewer, a Republican,
testifying before Congress in March.
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"Voter ID Law's Opponents Focused
on a Non-issue"
The Columbus Dispatch
May 1, 2008
Bradley A. Smith
I have been somewhat chagrined to emerge
in recent months as one of the more
prominent defenders of Indiana's photo
voter ID law, upheld this week by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Crawford vs. Marion
County Board of Elections. I say that
because, were I an Indiana legislator, I
probably would not have voted in favor of
the law. And I agree with those who argue
that there is not much voter fraud that can be
prevented, at least directly, by Indiana's law.
But as a matter of constitutional law, it
strikes me that the court's decision was
unremarkable and correct. The plaintiffs'
case was improbable in many ways. First,
the plaintiffs insisted on discussing the case
in terms of the number of people "affected"
by the law, and then tried to conflate
"affected" with "disenfranchised." This
made the plaintiffs' case seem rather
ridiculous. No one really believed that
hundreds of thousands of Indiana residents
would be deprived of voting rights by the
law, but that is what plaintiffs tried to claim.
Judges are not idiots. They saw right
through that gambit and the original trial
judge had some sharp language for the
plaintiffs.
Of course, many people who lack photo IDs
are affected by the law and will have to take
steps to comply with it, but not every burden
on the right to vote constitutes
disenfranchisement. After all, having to
register to vote is a burden, and there is no
doubt that more people don't vote because
of registration requirements than will not
vote because of photo ID requirements. Are
all voter-registration requirements therefore
unconstitutional? The plaintiffs never
attempted to answer such questions or to
provide the court with any principled
stopping point if it were to strike the Indiana
law as unconstitutional.
Plaintiffs also made the mistake of insisting
that there was no evidence of voter fraud
that the law could prevent, when there
clearly was evidence, if not a lot.
By refusing to concede any state interest in
managing elections and trying to prevent
fraud, plaintiffs weakened their case or,
perhaps, merely revealed what a weak case
they had.
While the law undoubtedly made voting a
little more difficult for a small number of
people, not one of the plaintiffs was actually
unable to vote because of the law.
Eventually, the plaintiffs and their allies
found a woman named Fay Buis-Ewing who
claimed to have been prevented from voting
by the law, and she gave a number of
interviews to the news media, until it was
discovered that she also claimed a residence
in Florida, was registered to vote there, and
was, therefore, quite probably ineligible to
vote in Indiana. Beyond being an
embarrassment, this also suggested at least
one case where the law worked as intended
to prevent an ineligible vote (Buis-Ewing
had tried to satisfy the photo ID requirement
with a Florida driver's license).
Ultimately, the inability of plaintiffs to find
individuals unable to vote because of the
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law (as opposed to finding it slightly more
difficult to vote because of the law), after a
statewide search of many months, doomed
their case.
Voting rights are among our most cherished
liberties. But allowing fraudulent votes
deprives us of voting rights, too. If you are
prevented from voting, your rights are
violated. But if your legitimate vote is
canceled by a fraudulent vote, you have
been effectively deprived of the right to
vote.
Under the Constitution, states have broad
power to regulate elections. One can
imagine requirements to vote that would rise
to the level of a constitutional violation. But
the judgment of the Indiana legislature that
voters should have to verify their identity
with a photo ID to vote seems eminently
reasonable to most people. The state
provides for indigents who cannot afford ID,
and it provides for provisional ballots for
those who arrive at the polls without ID.
In a case where not a single plaintiff actually
was unable to vote because of the law, a
decision by the court finding the law
unconstitutional would have been
unprecedented and thrown into doubt the
entire system of local election
administration.
If you think about it, what is surprising is
not the court's decision but the fact that the
case got that far at all.
Bradley A. Smith is a professor of law at
Capital University.
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"Voter Fraud"
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
May 4, 2008
Erwin Chemerinsky
May a state government impose a restriction
on voting that will keep tens of thousands of
eligible voters, especially African-American
and Latino citizens, from casting ballots
without any evidence that this is necessary
to prevent fraud? The answer should be
clear that such a limit is unconstitutional.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's ruling
on Monday [in Crawford vs. Marion County
Board of Elections] upholding a requirement
for photo identification in order to vote is
likely to lead to a wave of laws across the
country that will disenfranchise countless
voters. Even worse, the Supreme Court said
it does not matter if the restrictions are
motivated by partisan politics and the desire
of one political party to discourage votes for
the other.
At issue before the Supreme Court was an
Indiana law requiring photo identification in
order to vote. At first, this may seem
innocuous, but in operation it is quite
insidious.
The Indiana legislature adopted the
requirement with every Republican
legislator voting for it and every Democrat
voting against it. They knew statistics
consistently show that such a law has a far
greater effect on those likely to vote
Democratic, especially African Americans
and Latinos. The reality is there are many
individuals who do not have photo
identification and these tend to be the
poorest in society, often citizens of color.
It is estimated that, at a minimum, 43,000
eligible voters in Indiana will be denied the
ability to vote because they lack photo
identification. This might be justified if
there were a serious voter fraud problem in
Indiana and there was no other way to solve
it. But as Justice David Souter noted in his
dissenting opinion, there is not "a shred of
evidence that in-person voter impersonation
is a problem in the state."
Justice John Paul Stevens, in an opinion
joined by Chief Justice John Roberts and
Justice Anthony Kennedy, engaged in a
balancing test, concluding the state had a
legitimate interest in preventing fraud and
the burden on voting was minimal because
individuals could easily obtain photo
identification. Justice Antonin Scalia, joined
by Justices Clarence Thomas and Samuel
Alito, went even further, saying that a
requirement for voting, even if it keeps some
from voting, is allowed unless it has a
''severe" impact on voting.
The flaw in these justices' reasoning is it
ignores the fundamental nature of the right
to vote. Under traditional principles of
constitutional law, the government may
burden a fundamental right only if its action
is necessary to achieve a compelling
interest. The balancing test used by Justice
Stevens and the extreme deference advanced
by Justice Scalia is inconsistent with the
need for the government to prove that its
restrictions on a fundamental right are truly
essential. Justice Stevens said the
challengers had to meet a "heavy burden" to
have the law invalidated. But when a
fundamental right is involved, the burden is
always on the government to show that the
law is needed.
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For example, more than 40 years ago, the
Supreme Court invalidated a Virginia law
that imposed a poll tax of $1. The tax was
intended mainly to discourage blacks from
voting. The court was explicit that any
restriction that would keep some citizens
from voting could be tolerated only to
achieve interests of the greatest importance.
Under Justice Scalia's approach, such poll
taxes would be allowed because they apply
to everyone and do not have a "severe"
effect on voting.
Unfortunately, today's Supreme Court gave
no weight whatsoever to the partisan context
of Indiana's law and others like it. There
was no dispute that Republicans saw this
law as a way of lessening votes for
Democrats. But Justice Stevens said this did
not matter.
This is an open invitation to state
legislatures across the country to devise
requirements for voting that keep members
of the other political party from being able
to vote. So long as legislators assert their
goal is preventing fraud, even when there is
no evidence to support it, Monday's
decision will require that such laws be
upheld.
Long ago, the Supreme Court proclaimed
the right to vote is the most basic of all
liberties because it preserves all other rights.
It is this right that distinguishes a democracy
from all other forms of government.
Although the government certainly has a
vital interest in preventing fraud, more than
a mere assertion of the interest should be
required before tens of thousands are denied
the right to vote. The Supreme Court's
decision, and what it portends, is a major
setback for fairness and equality in voting-
and for American democracy.
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"Voter ID Law Sequels?"
Indiana Lawyer
July 9, 2008
Michael W. Hoskins
Two months have passed since the Supreme
Court of the United States upheld Indiana's
voter identification law requiring photo ID
for anyone casting a ballot in-person.
Potential sequels are already in the litigation
works, though it's debatable whether they
are actually considered "sequels."
While plaintiffs separately contend that
William Crawford, et al. v. Marion County
Election Board, 128 S. Ct. 1610 (2008),
either doesn't apply or endanger their
claims, the pair of suits signify the first
Indiana cases to come since the April 28
decision.
In its ruling, justices upheld the 2005-
enacted state law considered the country's
most strict voter ID statute. The conclusion
reached by the court as a whole was that the
law may be unconstitutional as applied to a
small number of voters who must incur cost
in order to obtain the ID but because that
case had no such voters as plaintiffs, it failed
to reach that claim.
That ruling rejected the facial challenge, but
left the door open for as applied challenges
in federal court and cases involving state
constitutional claims.
"Crawford took a pass on the (federal)
constitutionality but left it completely open
for state constitution challenges," said
Indianapolis attorney William Groth with
Fillenwarth Dennerline Groth & Towe, who
was an attorney in Crawford and is now co-
counsel on a state suit filed June 20 by the
League of Women Voters of Indiana. "So
that only minimally factors in. It discusses
the law, how it operates, and sets the legal
landscape for us, but doesn't have any
impact."
Those Indiana plaintiffs or attorneys say
they've been following similar issues
nationally, but at this point everyone is
operating independently and just trying to
distinguish their cases from the recent
ruling. The attorneys in each of the Hoosier
cases say their suits are "uniquely Indiana"
or "flipping Crawford on its head."
'Uniquely Indiana'
Filed in Marion Superior Court against
Indiana Secretary of State Todd Rokita, the
League of Women Voters argues it has the
standing to sue on behalf of its 1,100
members because the state statute burdens
those registered voters and would cause the
league to have to spend "precious resources"
assisting voters without the required ID.
Co-counsel in this case is Austin & Jones
attorney Karen Celestino-Horseman, a
former Indianapolis City-County Council
member and former attorney with the
Democratic Party.
Specifically, the suit says the 2005-passed
Indiana Voter ID law violates Article 2,
Section 2 of the state constitution that says
citizens only need to meet the age,
citizenship, and residency requirements in
order to cast a vote in-person. Any change
the legislature might make must come
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through a constitutional amendment, not a
statute, which didn't happen here, the suit
says.
The suit doesn't name any specific plaintiffs
but says the law prevents an "indeterminate
number of citizens in Marion County and
throughout the State from a casting a vote
that counts." It does mention two specific
election examples where individuals were
restricted from voting because of the law.
One came during the 2007 municipal
election when at least 34 voters arrived to
vote without the required photo ID and were
given provisional ballots-only two
produced that ID later to have their votes
count. The second example is from the May
2008 primary when 12 elderly St. Joseph
County nuns were not allowed to cast
provisional ballots because they didn't have
the required ID.
In Crawford, the League of Women Voters
of Indiana, Indianapolis, and the U.S. filed
an amicus curiae brief that cited specific
examples of voters by name who'd been
burdened by the photo ID requirement,
including some turned away from the polls.
Groth said those may end up being disclosed
in discovery but the group was reluctant to
do that now because this suit doesn't turn on
the nature or severity of the burden it
imposes.
"It's a strict question of constitutional
interpretation," he said. "Our argument will
turn on whether the voter ID law imposes a
new substantive requirement, or whether it's
merely regulating the mechanics of the
voting process. It's a subtle and nuanced
distinction, but our Indiana caselaw supports
that this must be a constitutional
amendment."
Groth said this suit presents an issue of first
impression that he expects will go to the
Indiana Supreme Court because he doesn't
know of any Hoosier caselaw specifically
addressing both the voter ID law and "a new
substantive qualification" on voting rights
relating to Article 2, Sec. 2. Caselaw cited in
the suit includes decisions holding that
constitutional section is mandatory and
doesn't allow legislative change without a
constitutional amendment. Those cases are
Morris v. Powell, 125 Ind. 281, 25 N.E. 221
(Ind. 1890), Board of Election
Commissioners of City of Indianapolis v.
Knight, 117 N.E. 565, 567 (Ind. 1917), as
well as State ex rel. McGonigle v. Madison
Circuit Court, 193 N.E.2d 242, 249, (Ind.
1963).
The suit requests a speedy hearing for a
declaratory relief in time for the Nov. 4
general election, though Groth expects the
controversial issues involved here will
require this case to be appealed and that
could take longer.
"It's likely that given the novelty and
importance of these issues, the trial court
won't be the final word," he said.
'Flipping Crawford on its Head'
A point in the League of Women voters suit
is what Indianapolis attorney and registered
voter Robbin Stewart argues is a main thrust
of his lawsuit, filed well before the May
primary in state court and since removed to
federal court; he hasn't gotten a resolution
and the primary has come and gone.
In the LWV suit, the organization points out
that many of its members do possess a
driver's license but philosophically object to
"being compelled to produce at the polls the
restrictive form of identification" now
required.
Stewart said he's coming at his suit as "one
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of the 99 percent who do have the required
identification." That's what makes this
different from Crawford, which came at the
issue from the perspective of those burdened
voters without ID, he said.
"Yes, I do see this as a sequel," Stewart said,
noting that this is an as-applied challenge for
which the Crawford court specifically left
the door open. "I've been turned away from
voting, and that's not right."
Stewart filed a state suit in Marion County
on April 18. He made similar claims as the
LWV did, but the defendants-Marion
County, Clerk Beth White, and three
unnamed "Jane Does" who were the election
workers who prevented his voting-moved
to remove the case to the Southern District
of Indiana and that happened June 16,
despite Stewart's objections. The
Indianapolis federal judge also dismissed the
claims against the election workers, though
allowing him to re-file if he obtains names.
Regarding his lawsuit, Stewart said he has
been turned away-not because he doesn't
have a valid, state-issued driver's license,
but because he philosophically opposes
being forced to show it to vote. It's different
when going to an airport or driving a car,
because those aren't constitutional rights, he
said. When asked casually to show his ID,
he hesitates at first but agrees to produce it
only because he isn't being forced to do so.
Though he has an ID, Stewart pointed out he
has been burdened by this law in the year
that he didn't have a driver's license and
struggled to get one in the first year the
Indiana statute went into effect in 2005.
He'd misplaced the license, and said he had
to pay to travel to Delaware to get a birth
certificate copy from his mother. He then
had an issue with the Indiana Bureau of
Motor Vehicles after that because he'd
legally changed his name when he was
young and the records didn't match, and the
branch wouldn't accept documentation
about the name change as confirmation.
"It's a catch-22 and is more hassle than
reasonable," he said, adding the issue was
resolved about a year later. "I vote because
it's important to me, but some would rather
stay home than go through this."
He claims in his suit that election workers
and authorities shouldn't be able to demand
his identification for voting without a search
warrant, and that violates Fourth
Amendment rights against search and
seizures. He also contends that due process
and other constitutional amendments are
being violated by this state law.
"In America, you don't go around showing
your paperwork to everyone when you're
just exercising your right to walk down the
street or cast a vote that counts. You should
get upset about that," he said.
Now, those state constitutional arguments
have mostly dissolved as the federal
questions are considered. The parties have
through July and August to file documents
with the court to explain how any portion of
the suit can proceed post-Crawford.
Stewart worries that his suit could get
bogged down with issues that won't
ultimately lead to any adequate resolution.
"Honestly, I assumed the ACLU and the
Democrats would win in Crawford," he said.
"Afterward, I saw the hope that we could
preserve this possibility for the Indiana
courts to consider. I'd still like to see that
happen, but if it doesn't, I intend to get to
the merits eventually."
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VOTING RIGHTS A CT REA UTHORIZA TION
"Vote Law Appeal Likely by Early Fall"
SCOTUSblog.com
June 8, 2008
Lyle Denniston
The highly visible challenge to Congress'
renewal of the law that requires nine states
and parts of seven others to get Washington
clearance before they change election laws
probably will not develop fast enough to
have an impact in this year's election
campaign. Any of those governments that
seek to alter election procedures between
now and Nov. 4, election day, will still have
to seek permission.
Lawyers for the local Texas government unit
who are pursuing the challenge to the
Voting Right Act's renewal do not plan to
try to block a May 30 decision by a three-
judge District Court upholding the law's
extension until 2032.
Given court schedules, the formal notice that
the case is going to be appealed to the
Supreme Court is not due until July 29.
Once such a notice of appeal is filed,
attorneys have another 60 days-unless they
ask for more-to file the actual appeal in the
Supreme Court. That might indicate the
appeal would arrive by mid- to late-
September. (Lawyers involved say that, if
they do go through with an appeal, they
would not seek more than 60 days to go
forward with their case before the Justices.
While an appeal is widely considered to be a
certainty, the lawyers have indicated they
are still considering whether to do so.)
The lawsuit in Northwest Austin Municipal
Utility District Number One v. Mukasey is
the case that opponents of any continuation
of the voting change pre-clearance
requirement have been waiting to see unfold
for at least the past decade. Since the
Supreme Court in 1997, in City of Boerne v.
Flores, sharply restricted Congress' power
to write new laws on civil rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment, those opponents
have thought the Voting Rights Act's key
Section 5 (the pre-clearance provision) was
vulnerable to constitutional attack. Congress
relied, in part, on the Fourteenth
Amendment in extending Section 5 for 25
years.
For example, in a new book, Deconstructing
the Republic, Anthony A. Peacock, a
political science professor at Utah State
University, writes that this provision is "ripe
for a City of Boerne challenge." The only
basis for extending the law beyond its earlier
scheduled expiration date of August 2007,
Peacock added, "is if it could have been
established that blacks were still
systematically excluded from the political
process in the South in some way similar to
the way they were in the mid-1960s. The
evidence, however, shows overwhelmingly
that this is not the case." (The Section 5
limit on election law changes in covered
governments dates originally from 1965.)
Now that the Northwest Austin district's
case has mounted that anticipated challenge,
the Supreme Court may well have to decide
which of two constitutional standards to
apply in judging the validity of the Section 5
renewal. One standard, clearly the easiest to
meet, is whether Congress had any rational
basis for the extension.
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But that is not the standard that the Texas
governmental unit, and other opponents of
the extension in general, have wanted to
apply. The much more rigorous standard
they prefer, spelled out in the City of Boerne
decision 11 years ago, requires Congress to
prove that a civil rights law must be
"proportional" and "congruent"-that is, the
remedy for the problem, here discrimination
in voting based on race, must stay close to
the nature of the problem sought to be
remedied.
The more lenient standard-the rationality
test-dates from a series of Supreme Court
decisions, beginning in 1966, that have
upheld the passage of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965 and several renewals of it. In more
liberal academic circles, the Court's ruling
in the City of Boerne case and sequels to it
have been viewed as undercutting the
rationality test. Yale law professor Own
Fiss, for example, wrote last year that the
tougher Boerne test appeared to have
"emptied . . . of any significance" the earlier
test, originating in two 1966 decisions,
South Carolina v. Katzenbach and
Katzenback v. Morgan.
The three-judge District Court, in its ruling
near the end of last month upholding Section
5's renewal, directly confronted this choice.
It concluded that the rationality test still
controls, when Congress has acted to deal'
with racial discrimination in voting under
the Fifteenth Amendment's guarantee of
race equality at the ballot box. Applying that
test, and citing what it called a massive
amount of evidence that Congress gathered
showing that race bias in voting persists
today, the District Court upheld the
extension.
But, the District Court went further. It
applied the City of Boerne test as an
alternative basis for its ruling, and found that
the Section 5 renewal still passed
constitutional muster. Its reasoning, both on
the rationality test and on the Boerne
standard, relied in considerable part upon
past statements by the Supreme Court
suggesting that it regarded race bias in
voting as something different from the
federal laws it had struck down under the
Boerne approach.
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"Court Upholds Key Provisions
of the Voting Rights Act"
New York Times
May 31, 2008
Neil A. Lewis
WASHINGTON-A special three-judge
court ruled Friday that Congress acted
constitutionally when it extended the law
requiring sections of the country with a
history of racial discrimination to get federal
approval for any changes in voting
procedures.
The unanimous decision upheld a central
provision of the Voting Rights Act, which
Congress initially passed in 1965 and has
extended several times since, most recently
for 25 years in 2006. Section 5 of the law
prohibits several states, mostly in the South,
and some local government agencies from
changing their election practices without
permission from the Justice Department or
the courts.
Each renewal of the law has been followed
by a legal challenge from some state or local
agency to this "preclearance" requirement.
The latest challenge was undertaken by the
board of a public utility near Austin, Tex.,
which said the requirement conferred a
"badge of shame" over "conditions that
existed 30 or more years ago but have long
since been remedied."
The Northwest Austin Utility District argued
that Congress lacked sufficient evidence of
racial discrimination to justify the intrusion
on state sovereignty.
Judge David S. Tatel, who wrote Friday's
decision, agreed with the Justice
Department, however, that Congress was
appropriately concerned about
discrimination against minority voters. The
law was extended, Judge Tatel said, only
after substantial Congressional findings that
"attempts to discriminate persist and
evolve." He noted that from 1980 to 2000,
the attorney general acted to block 421
voting changes that the Justice Department
had found "intentionally discriminatory."
The law initially applied only to the states of
the Confederacy and was intended to
address schemes like poll taxes, which,
dating from Reconstruction, were devised by
local officials to discourage black voter
participation. But its requirements have
since been expanded to some parts of New
York, Michigan and California, where the
concern is about the rights of ethnic groups
other than African-Americans.
Judge Tatel, of the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit,
was joined in Friday's decision by Paul L.
Friedman and Emmet G. Sullivan, both
federal district judges in Washington. Under
the Voting Rights Act, their ruling may be
appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
Such an appeal is considered likely.
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"Congressional Power to Extend Preclearance
Under the Voting Rights Act"
American Constitution Society for Law and Policy
June 2006
Pamela S. Karlan
[Excerpt: All footnotes have been omitted.]
At the signing ceremony for the Voting
Rights Act of 1965, President Lyndon B.
Johnson called the Act "one of the most
monumental laws in the entire history of
American freedom." The Act is rightly
celebrated as the cornerstone of the Second
Reconstruction. That we needed a Second
Reconstruction is an important fact about
American history: the First Reconstruction,
which at one point saw levels of voter
turnout among black men and black
electoral success that would be the envy of
any state today ended with cynical political
compromises, concerted vote suppression,
and judicial indifference. It took the Civil
Rights Movement of the 1950's and 1960's
to resuscitate the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments' promise of political
integration.
That promise still has not been fully
redeemed. Certainly, we have not yet
attained universal adult citizen suffrage.
Over 1.4 million black citizens are
disenfranchised today by offender
disenfranchisement statutes that, like our
continued embrace of the death penalty,
distinguish the United States from every
other advanced democracy. Many states
have recently adopted restrictive voter I.D.
requirements that threaten to become a new
form of poll tax. Language barriers still
prevent many citizens from effectively
casting their ballots. And in many parts of
the country, minority voters either remain
unable to elect the candidates of their choice
or are able to do so only from deliberately
constructed majority-minority districts. One
of the Act's most targeted remedies-the
preclearance regime of sections 4 and 5,
which requires certain jurisdictions to satisfy
federal authorities that proposed changes in
their election laws have neither a
discriminatory purpose nor a discriminatory
effect before implementing them-is set to
expire in 2007. Congress is now considering
proposals to extend the preclearance regime
for another twenty-five years and to amend
the standard for preclearance in response to
recent Supreme Court decisions. The level
of bipartisan support within both the House
and the Senate makes it almost certain that
the Act will be renewed in some form. The
question thus arises: does Congress retain
the power to impose this "complex scheme
of stringent remedies" or has the world
changed?
In this position paper, I address one aspect
of the question: have recent changes in legal
doctrine undercut congressional authority?
This question has occasioned a fair amount
of recent commentary, much of it focused on
the implications of the Rehnquist Court's
"new federalism." I suggest, to borrow from
Tennyson's Ulysses, that while much is
taken, much abides: the preclearance regime
continues to satisfy the Supreme Court's
construction of congressional enforcement
powers under the Reconstruction
Amendments. And I go further, to suggest
that the Court's decisions under the elections
clause of Article I, § 4 and under the equal
protection clause with respect to political
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gerrymanders reinforce the Act's
constitutionality. ...
II. FROM SECTION 5 TO ARTICLE I
AND BACK AGAIN: SOURCES OF
CONGRESSIONAL POWER TO
PROTECT VOTING RIGHTS
Each time that Congress has taken up the
Voting Rights Act of 1965, it has relied on
its powers under the enforcement clauses of
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
Those amendments recognized a special role
for Congress, as opposed to the courts, in
protecting individual rights. As then-
Professor Michael McConnell has
explained:
Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment was born of the fear
that the judiciary would frustrate
Reconstruction by a narrow
interpretation of congressional
power.... As Republican Senator
Oliver Morton explained: "the
remedy for the violation of the
fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments was expressly not left
to the courts. The remedy was
legislative, because in each the
amendment itself provided that it
shall be enforced by legislation on
the part of Congress."
Michael McConnell, Institutions and
Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne
v. Flores, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 153, 182
(1997) (quoting Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 2d
Sess. 525 (1872)).
The Supreme Court has continued to
recognize that special role when it comes to
the protection of fundamental rights and
traditionally excluded groups. In City of
Boerne v. Flores, the Court observed that a
distinction exists between "measures that
remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions
and measures that make a substantive
change in the governing law." And it
recognized that "Congress must have wide
latitude" with respect to measures that fall in
the first-remedial or prophylactic-
category. In particular, the Court pointed to
the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as an
exemplar of appropriate legislation under
the Fourteenth Amendment, even though
some provisions clearly "prohibit[ed]
conduct which [was] not itself
unconstitutional and intrude[d] into
'legislative spheres of autonomy previously
reserved to the States."'
So why have so many commentators
suggested that the Rehnquist Court's new
federalism decisions cast doubt on
Congress's power to extend the Voting
Rights Act? In part, their hesitation may
reflect Boerne 's citation of only pre-1982
Voting Rights Act cases: the Court's opinion
might be taken to deliberately avoid passing
on the question whether the 1982 extension
of the preclearance regime satisfied the
congruence and proportionality
requirements Boerne articulates.
But skepticism about congressional
enforcement power under Boerne more
likely rests not on Boerne itself, but on a
parallel line of cases involving one
particular exercise of congressional
enforcement power. The Term before
Boerne, in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, the Supreme Court held that
Congress cannot use its Article I powers
(such as the commerce power) to abrogate
the Eleventh Amendment sovereign
immunity states enjoy against lawsuits by
private citizens. In the decade since
Seminole Tribe and Boerne, the Supreme
Court has frequently revisited the question
of congressional power, and although it may
be somewhat premature, even now, to say
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that the dust has settled completely, the
following principles articulated in the
decided cases may be helpful in
understanding the scope of Congress's
power to amend and extend the Voting
Rights Act.
First, the Court has drawn a sharp distinction
between the scope of Congress's regulatory
power, to which it continues to give broad
effect, and Congress's remedial arsenal,
which Seminole Tribe and its progeny have
narrowed. In cases such as Alden v. Maine,
Kimel v. Florida Bd. Of Regents, and Board
of Trustees v. Garrett, the Court expressly
noted that Congress could bind the state
officials and agencies involved and require
them to follow federal law. What it could
not do was enforce those constraints by
authorizing private damages actions. The
Alden Court explicitly compared private
damages lawsuits, which it held foreclosed
by the eleventh amendment, to lawsuits
brought by the United States to enforce
individuals' rights, noting that "[s]uits
brought by the United States itself require
the exercise of political responsibility,"
which brings them within the "plan of the
[Constitutional] Convention" and
"subsequent constitutional amendments"
regarding the relationship between the
federal and state governments.
Second, with respect to Congress's power
under the fourteenth and fifteenth
amendments, the Court has not only
continued to recognize the vitality of
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, but has further held
that congressional remedial and prophylactic
power is at its strongest when Congress acts
to remedy or prevent the kinds of practices
that the Court has subjected to heightened
judicial scrutiny. Put in simple terms, when
Congress acts to protect a fundamental right
or when it acts to protect a suspect or quasi-
suspect class, its powers are broader than
when it acts to promote equality more
generally. Thus, in Tennessee v. Lane, the
Court upheld Congress's abrogation of
states' sovereign immunity under Title II of
the Americans with Disabilities Act with
respect to the fundamental right of access to
the courts, and in Nevada Dep 't of Human
Resources v. Hibbs, it upheld Congress's
abrogation of states' sovereign immunity
under the Family and Medical Leave Act
because the act was intended to prevent sex
discrimination in violation of the equal
protection clause. Moreover, Hibbs and
Lane also reaffirm the principle that
Congress can "enact prophylactic legislation
proscribing practices that are discriminatory
in effect, if not in intent, to carry out the
basic objectives of the Equal Protection
Clause."
Third, the Court has implicitly recognized a
special role for Congress in addressing equal
protection values in situations where courts
are ill-equipped to confront those issues
without congressional guidance. In Vieth v.
Jubelirer, the Court revisited the
constitutionality of partisan political
gerrymanders. All nine Justices
acknowledged that excessive partisan
gerrymanders raise serious constitutional
questions and all nine located the
constitutional infirmity at least in part in the
equal protection clause. And yet, a majority
of the Court refused to adjudicate the
plaintiffs' challenge to Pennsylvania's
congressional redistricting. Justice Scalia, in
a plurality opinion for himself, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices O'Connor and
Scalia, would have held political
gerrymandering claims nonjusticiable
altogether, because "no judicially
discernible and manageable standards for
adjudicating political gerrymandering claims
have emerged." Justice Kennedy, concurring
in the judgment, was unwilling to foreclose
the possibility that such standards might
emerge in the future, but he explained that
"[t]he lack ... of any agreed upon model of
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fair and effective representation" made it
difficult for courts to determine, "by the
exercise of their own judgment," whether a
particular plan unconstitutionally "burden[s]
representational rights."
But although the plurality thought courts
could not provide a remedy for partisan
gerrymanders, it recognized that "the
Framers provided a remedy," at least for
gerrymandered congressional districts, in the
elections clause. While the clause locates
initial control over congressional elections
in the state legislatures, it provides that
"Congress may at any time by Law make or
alter such Regulations." Since 1842,
Congress has used this power to impose a
particular theory of representation on the
states, by requiring the use of geographically
defined single-member districts to elect
Representatives. The decision to use such
districts reflects, among other things, a
commitment to a form of proportionality, in
which one faction or party cannot capture a
state's entire congressional delegation (as
might be true under an at-large system) and
a preference for geographically discrete and
insular groups over groups whose members
are not geographically concentrated. Thus,
Congress has a special role to play in
ensuring fair representation in federal
elections that includes choosing among
theories of effective representation.
Arguably, that role should carry over to
ensuring fair representation in state and local
elections as well. The fourteenth and
fifteenth amendments expressly confer
enforcement power on Congress, and the
abrogation analysis in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer
recognizes that the amendments marked a
profound "shift in the federal-state balance."
The new allocation of authority parallels the
allocation under the elections clause: under
section 45 of the fourteenth amendment and
section 2 of the fifteenth amendment,
Congress can override the states' initial
decisions if the intervention safeguards the
equal protection, due process, and
antidiscrimination values expressed by those
amendments.
The Supreme Court's recent decisions under
the elections clause have confirmed the
longstanding interpretation of the clause as a
grant of essentially plenary authority. In
Cook v. Gralike, the Court stated that the
clause "encompasses matters like 'notices,
registration, supervision of voting,
protection of voters, prevention of fraud and
corrupt practices, counting of votes, duties
of inspectors and canvassers, and making
and publication of election returns."' And it
is "well settled" that Congress can "override
state regulations" involving these matters."
Moreover, even when Congress does not
intervene, the states' regulatory power is not
an aspect of their sovereignty:
Because any state authority to
regulate election to those offices
could not precede their very
creation by the Constitution, such
power had to be delegated to,
rather than reserved by, the States.
. . . No other constitutional
provision gives the States authority
over congressional elections, and
no such authority could be reserved
under the Tenth Amendment.
Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 522 (2001).
Finally, the elections clause has long been
interpreted to give Congress power over so-
called "mixed elections"-that is, to permit
Congress to regulate all aspects of an
election (or an electoral process) used even
in part to select members of Congress. So,
for example, defendants have been
convicted in federal court for vote buying
with respect to local offices that appeared on
the same ballot as uncontested primaries for
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congressional office.
Taken together, these various lines of cases
suggest that congressional power is at its
apogee when Congress acts to protect
fundamental rights, to protect suspect or
quasi-suspect classes, to regulate electoral
processes that involve the selection of
members of Congress, to deal with issues
relating to politics and political value
judgments that are relatively unamenable to
judicial resolution under the Constitution
alone, and does so through mechanisms that
"require the exercise of political
responsibility" by the federal government.
All of these factors are in play with respect
to the preclearance regime. First, the
Supreme Court has recognized, for over a
century, that the right to vote is a
"fundamental political right, because
preservative of all rights." Indeed, one of the
reasons the elections clause gives Congress
"''comprehensive' authority to regulate the
details of elections," is because "experience
shows" that safeguards "'are necessary in
order to enforce the fundamental right
involved."'
Second, the Voting Rights Act protects
groups-racial and ethnic minorities-that
are normally entitled to heightened scrutiny
under the equal protection clause. To be
sure, the Act reaches conduct that would not
itself violate the equal protection clause,
since it reaches acts that have a
discriminatory effect regardless of the
purpose behind them. But Hibbs as well as
the Court's own voting rights cases applying
various results tests all rest on an
understanding that Congress can prohibit
practices that have a disparate impact as part
of its enforcement of the rights protected by
the equal protection clause.
Third, the Voting Rights Act involves an
area-regulation of the political process-
that both raises important issues of political
fairness that are not fully determined by the
sweeping commands of sections 1 of the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment and
that are particularly within the expertise of
politicians. Part of the reason the Supreme
Court has grappled with the justiciability of
political gerrymandering claims for nearly
forty years is precisely because the issue
calls on courts to decide among hotly
contested theories of effective
representation. To give just one example
that bears on the proposed amendment to
section 5 responding to Georgia v. Ashcroft,
people active in and knowledgeable about
politics differ vociferously about whether, in
crafting electoral districts, political fairness
is better ensured by drawing each district to
be as competitive as possible (which
increases both the chances that any
individual voter will cast a decisive ballot
and the risk that small changes in electoral
preferences can produce grossly
disproportionate legislative bodies) or by
drawing districts that are predictably
controlled by identifiable blocs of voters
(which can produce proportional
representation of the blocs within the
legislative body but which results in larger
numbers of voters casting essentially
meaningless, or "wasted," votes). Thus, with
respect to apportionment, any regulation of
the process demands choosing among
theories of representation: if the Court
cannot do this in the first instance, then
Congress should perhaps have more leeway
to make initial choices.
Finally, the preclearance regime of section 5
represents a quintessential exercise of
political responsibility. In replacing case-by-
case adjudication directly under the
Constitution with an administrative regime
designed to deter as well as to remedy
denials of the right to vote, Congress (and
ultimately the executive branch in the course
of administrative preclearance) finally
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exercised the power it had been given by the
enforcement provisions of the
Reconstruction amendments.
The necessary parties to a judicial
preclearance proceeding are the covered
jurisdiction and the United States. And the
covered jurisdiction is always the plaintiff,
invoking the jurisdiction of the federal court.
Thus, section 5 raises none of the specific
concerns that the abrogation cases involve,
since it does not implicate the eleventh
amendment. Nor does the preclearance
regime inherently run afoul of general
federalism concerns. In fact, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly turned aside
constitutional challenges based on the
structure of the preclearance regime itself.
Most recently, in Lopez v. Monterey County,
the Court rejected a covered jurisdiction's
Boerne-inflected challenge, stating that
while "the Voting Rights Act, by its nature,
intrudes on state sovereignty[, t]he Fifteenth
Amendment permits this intrusion." The
permissible intrusion involves not only the
requirement of preclearance, but also the
imposition of the burden of proof on the
covered jurisdiction to show not only the
absence of a discriminatory purpose, but
also the absence of a retrogressive effect.
And as we have already seen, with respect to
the Act's regulation of a mixed electoral
process-and the bulk of the voting
practices preclearance reaches occur within
the mixed process-even the more
atmospheric federalism of the Tenth
amendment holds little sway.
Ironically, one of the policy-based criticisms
of the current administration's policies-that
preclearance decisions are often subject to
political considerations and that the
recommendations of career personnel are
overridden by presidential appointees-may
actually reinforce the constitutionality of the
preclearance regime by showing that it is
subject to "the exercise of political
responsibility."
III. THE EVIDENCE OF THINGS NOT
SEEN: THE PROPRIETY OF
EXTENDING PRECLEARANCE
Under Boerne, legislation constitutes
appropriate enforcement of the provisions of
the Reconstruction era amendments if there
is "congruence and proportionality between
the injury to be prevented or remedied and
the means adopted to that end." Given
Boerne 's implicit reaffirmance of City of
Rome v. United States, which had upheld
both the substance and duration of the 1975
extension of the preclearance regime, and
Lopez 's rejection of a Boerne-based attack
on section 5, the only plausibly open
constitutional question is whether something
has changed between City of Rome, City of
Boerne, Lopez and today to render an act
Congress once had the power to pass now
beyond its authority to renew.
The predicate for such a holding would
presumably be that political conditions in
the covered jurisdictions have changed so
substantially that the strong medicine of
preclearance is no longer warranted-what
Rick Hasen colorfully calls "the 'Bull
Connor is Dead' problem." As evidence of
this change, commentators cite the huge
increase in minority registration and the
numbers of minority elected officials within
covered jurisdictions. Some scholars have
claimed that minority turnout in covered
jurisdictions has come to exceed minority
turnout in other parts of the nation. Others
have pointed to the minuscule, and
declining, number of objections interposed
under section 5.
The difficulty with all this evidence is that it
is entirely consistent with two contradictory
stories. Under the optimistic story, either the
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preclearance regime or secular changes in
race relations have worked a fundamental
transformation in politics within the covered
jurisdictions: minority citizens are now
integrated into the political process in a way
that will not be undone by lifting
preclearance. The political situation of
minority citizens within covered
jurisdictions thus no longer differs in a
legally significant way from their position in
the remainder of the country. The decline in
the number of objections reflects the lack of
either the desire or the practical ability of
covered jurisdictions to make retrogressive
changes. Minority elected officials, and the
political party-the Democrats-that
depends on minority electoral support (often
even for the success of its nonminority
candidates and officials), can prevent
backsliding. Under the realist story, the
preclearance regime both played, and
continues to play, a more critical role in
minority citizens' political integration. Put
simply, the realists (among whom I count
myself) think that the political gains
minority citizens have achieved since the
passage of the Act are sufficiently recent
and the incentives for officials to ignore the
interests of minority voters are sufficiently
attractive that backsliding would occur in
the absence of the Act's substantive and
procedural protections. To understand why
the evidence regarding Section 5 objections
does not answer the question whether
circumstances have changed, it is important
to understand that Section 5 operates in four
distinct, albeit related, ways. First, section 5
performs a blocking function: the
Department of Justice or the three-judge
district court can deny a covered jurisdiction
the right to implement discriminatory
changes. Section 5 has been used, even since
the last extension in 1982, to block more
than 1,000 changes that would have
impaired the rights of literally millions of
voters in covered jurisdictions.
But the other three ways section 5 functions
are not captured in the record of objections.
Most obviously, section 5 performs a
deterrent function. Jurisdictions that know
that a change will not be precleared may
decide not even to attempt making it. Here,
preclearance performs a valuable function
not fully captured by other, more global
prohibitions on discriminatory election
practices.
Under all of the other prohibitions, the
burden of challenging a government practice
falls on the affected individuals. The cost of
such suits, however, is often prohibitive.
Consider one famous example. In City of
Mobile v. Bolden, the Supreme Court held
that the fourteenth amendment and the then-
existing version of section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act required plaintiffs who claimed
racial vote dilution to prove that the
challenged electoral system was adopted or
maintained for purposefully discriminatory
reasons. In order to prove such a purpose, on
remand the plaintiffs hired three historians
to trace the history of Mobile's election
system. Based on the evidence they
uncovered after months of archival work,
the district court ultimately issued a lengthy
opinion tracing the tortuous history of the
city's electoral practices that found a series
of discriminatory modifications. But the cost
of proving what turned out to be a blatant
series of constitutional violations was
staggering: the plaintiffs' lawyers logged
5,525 hours and spent $96,000 in out of
pocket expenses, and these figures do not
include the expenses incurred by the
Department of Justice after it intervened or
the costs of hiring the expert witnesses,
which are not now compensable. Given the
minuscule size of the voting rights bar,
placing the burdens on individual voters-
who, after all, may have relatively little
incentive to vote in the first place, let alone
litigate their right to vote-means many
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discriminatory
unchallenged....
changes
IV. CONCLUSION
The preclearance regime of
Rights Act has properly been c
as strong medicine. But the dise
it was addressed was per
may go persistent and had proved itself resistant to
less stringent remedies. Congress should
have the authority, under its enforcement
powers, to conclude that the course of
treatment is not yet fully complete and to
prescribe another round of medicine.
Particularly given the Court's most recent
the Voting decisions dealing with congressional power,
haracterized there is no reason to revisit the unbroken
ase to which line of cases upholding the provisions of the
vasive and Voting Rights Act as appropriate legislation.
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"Tiny Water District Is Challenging
Voting Rights Act"
San Antonio Express News
September 8, 2006
Janet Elliot
AUSTIN-When the Northwest Austin
Municipal Utility District No. I wanted to
move its sole polling place from a
residential garage to a school four years ago,
it had to pay a lawyer $1,250 to file a letter
with the U.S. Justice Department and wait
two months for permission.
Even though district leaders said they
wanted to move the polling location to boost
voter turnout, they had to convince the
Justice Department the change wouldn't
reduce minority voting participation.
Known as "preclearance," the process is a
key feature of the Voting Rights Act, the
civil rights legislation recently reauthorized
by Congress for 25 years.
Last month, the MUD challenged the
constitutionality of the law in a federal
lawsuit against Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales. Civil rights groups fear the case
could reverse decades of improvements for
minority voters in Texas and 15 other states
subject to the preclearance scrutiny.
"It's kind of unusual to have a rather
obscure water district north of Austin
challenge the constitutionality of a major
civil rights statute that applies to all of
Texas. It has to be taken seriously," said
Rolando Rios, a San Antonio lawyer who
often represents the League of United Latin
American Citizens in voting rights cases.
LULAC and the NAACP are considering
intervening in the case.
Edward Blum, a prominent critic of
affirmative action and racial policies who
directs the Project on Fair Representation,
said Thursday that the lawsuit is the "first of
what I think will be other Texas jurisdictions
that come forward" to challenge the law.
The project is a litigation group that fights
certain race-based policies.
The strategy reflects a move to federal
courts after conservative lawmakers failed to
change the preclearance requirements.
Several Republicans, mainly from Texas and
other Southern states, argued the provision
may violate the Constitution on grounds that
it unfairly punishes their states for
discrimination that is long past.
The MUD filed its lawsuit in a Washington
federal court Aug. 4, just days after
President Bush signed legislation renewing
the act. The district is arguing its voters are
being punished for conditions that never
existed in the quiet neighborhood of upper-
middle-class homes.
"This little district has never discriminated
against anybody," said Greg Coleman, an
Austin lawyer who's representing the
district pro bono.
Coleman said he believes the lawsuit is the
first filed by a Texas political subdivision
invoking a provision in the law to "bail out"
from preclearance.
Cynthia Magnuson, a Justice Department
spokeswoman, declined comment on the
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lawsuit. She said the department will
respond to the court by the Oct. 16 deadline.
Texas and its cities, counties, school districts
and other political subdivisions have been
subject to preclearance for changes in voting
procedures since 1975.
Bill Ferguson, president of the MUD's
board of directors, said it's absurd that the
district has to "jump through so many
hoops" to make changes designed to boost
voter turnout.
The MUD board approved filing the lawsuit
in June after lengthy discussions in
executive sessions, said Ferguson, a real
estate appraiser who has served on the board
for four years.
He said Coleman, who was representing the
board on another matter, convinced the
board that preclearance requirements are a
costly problem for many small jurisdictions.
"We're not against the Voting Rights Act
and the many good things it has done,"
Ferguson said. "But at some point this
preclearance issue should go away."
Ferguson said the five board members all
are Anglo. He said there are some minorities
living in the district but he knows of none
who has sought election to the board.
The district of 1,300 homes, two apartment
complexes, a church and some office
buildings, was set up in 1987 so the
developer could recover the costs of
installing water and wastewater
infrastructure. It levies a tax of 30-cents-per-
$100 valuation to buy those services from
the city of Austin.
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"Voting Rights Act Extension Passes
in Senate, 98 to 0"
The Washington Post
July 21, 2006
Charles Babington
The Senate voted 98 to 0 to renew key
provisions of the Voting Rights Act
yesterday, permitting the federal
government to continue its broad oversight
of state voting procedures for the next
quarter-century, and allowing Republicans
to claim equality with Democrats in
protecting minorities' clout at the ballot box.
The act requires several states, mostly in the
South, to obtain Justice Department
approval a before changing precinct
boundaries, polling places, legislative
districts, ballot formats and other voting
procedures. It also requires many
jurisdictions throughout the nation to
provide bilingual ballots or interpreters for
voters whose English is not strong.
Those two provisions caused a mini-revolt
among House Republicans last week. GOP
leaders had to scramble-and rely on heavy
Democratic support-to defeat proposed
amendments that they said would dilute the
bill and prove politically embarrassing.
The law, first passed in 1965, retains near-
iconic status in civil rights circles, even
though some elected officials say it is no
longer needed. GOP leaders were eager to
renew it before the November elections.
Unlike the House, where some Southern
Republicans opposed provisions that focus
on their states, the Senate passed the bill
unanimously after hours of one-sided debate
in which member after member praised
leaders of the 1960s desegregation
movement.
President Bush, addressing the NAACP's
annual convention while the debate was
underway, said he looked forward to signing
the measure. "A generation of Americans
that has grown up in the last few decades
may not appreciate what this act has meant,"
he said. "Condi Rice understands what this
act has meant," Bush said, referring to the
secretary of state, an African American who
grew up in Alabama in the 1950s and '60s.
The disharmony evident during the House's
deliberations on the act barely touched
yesterday's Senate proceedings, in which
lawmakers from both parties and all regions
agreed that the Voting Rights Act remains
pertinent and necessary. Several black
House members-including Rep. John
Lewis (D-Ga.), who worked alongside the
Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. in the 1960s-
were on the Senate floor for the vote. Sen.
Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) shook hands
with Rep. Melvin Watt (D-N.C.), chairman
of the Congressional Black Caucus, when
the result was announced.
"As we reflect on the true wrongs that
existed in the 1950s and 1960s and where
those wrongs may have taken place, we owe
it to history . .. to pay tribute to those who
took the law and made it a reality," Sen.
Johnny Isakson (R-Ga.), whose House
colleagues led the opposition in the other
chamber, said during the debate.
Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.) was a bit
more grudging. "While I support this bill, I
continue to have some serious concerns with
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several aspects of it," including its
"extension for an extraordinary 25 years,"
he said from the floor. The defeated House
amendments, he said, "would have
strengthened this bill and updated it to
reflect the reality of profoundly improved
race relations" in Georgia.
The act, originally signed by President
Lyndon B. Johnson, outlawed practices such
as poll taxes and literacy tests that many
Southern jurisdictions used to depress black
voter turnout. As amended over the years, it
required such jurisdictions to obtain federal
"pre-clearance" for an array of voting-
related practices that might have the effect
of reducing minority voters' influence.
Some local and national officials say the
targeted oversight is no longer justified and
is a relic of days when Southern states could
not be trusted to treat all citizens justly. But
others say abuses still occur. "Where would
the citizens of Georgia be-particularly low-
income and minority citizens-if they were
required to produce a government-issued
identification or pay $20 every five years in
order to vote?" Sen. John F. Kerry (D-
Mass.) asked in reference to measures
approved by the Georgia Legislature but
challenged in federal courts under the
Voting Rights Act.
Civil rights activist Jesse L. Jackson said in
an interview that the Senate vote called for
"restrained celebration," because the Bush
administration's Justice Department has
shown tepid enthusiasm for enforcing the
voting law. "This Justice Department, right
down the line, has chosen states' rights,"
Jackson said.
Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.)
called the vote a major success. "The Voting
Rights Act has worked," he said. "We need
to build upon that progress by extending
expiring provisions."
Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) called the act
"the cornerstone of our civil rights laws. We
honor those who fought through the years
for equality by extending the Voting Rights
Act to ensure that their struggles are not
forsaken and not forgotten, and that the
progress we have made not be sacrificed."
Caroline Fredrickson, director of the
ACLU's Washington Legislative Office,
praised the extension of the law's key
provisions and urged vigilant enforcement.
"We must look ahead to make sure the
promise is as true and strong as it was in
1965," she said. "Malicious attempts by
lawmakers to derail reauthorization show
the continuing need for this law and its
enforcement." She urged Bush "to sign this
legislation as soon as possible."
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"Some Officials, Scholars Say Voting
Rights Act Needs Update"
Chicago Tribune
July 13, 2006
Frank James
When it comes to renewing key parts of the
Voting Rights Act, the landmark 1965 law
that allowed many African-Americans to
cast ballots in places where they previously
couldn't because of racism, the situation is
far from black and white.
Most members of Congress want to renew
the law, set to expire next year, for 25 years,
with exactly the same provisions as exist.
But a group of House members, many from
the South, is seeking changes and has so far
put the issue on hold, though a House debate
and vote on renewal are scheduled for
Thursday. Approval would send the measure
to the Senate.
That some House Southerners appear to be
standing in the way of renewing the law
allows the situation to be easily caricatured
as a fight between congressional supporters
of civil rights and retro Southern
obstructionists.
There's just one problem. Even some left-
of-center legal scholars agree with the
Southerners that the provisions should not
be renewed without modifications.
Election-law experts who think an update is
essential say Congress runs the high risk of
seeing the Supreme Court overturn the act if
lawmakers simply renew it as is.
The reason? The court's judicial philosophy
shifted to the right when Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor retired. Even before she left, the
court was placing limits on Congress' ability
to legislate civil rights laws, experts say.
The court could take a dim view of the way
the act determines which jurisdictions
should still fall under it, experts say. The act
relies on significantly outdated voting data
from 1964, 1968 or 1972 elections, even
though minority-voting patterns have
changed greatly.
"If Congress goes and passes the
current version . . . as is, with a 25-year
extension . . . then there is a significant
danger that the measure is struck down,"
said Richard Hasen, a law professor at
Loyola University Law School in Los
Angeles who describes himself as part of the
Democratic Party's left wing.
"What I sense is that there are a number of
people who are supporters of the act, but
who don't want to speak up for political
reasons and say the act has to be updated, to
say that 2006 is not the same as 1965,"
Hasen said.
Samuel Issacharoff, a professor of
constitutional law at New York University
Law School, concurred. "Most voters of
today were not alive in 1964 or certainly
were not eligible to vote in 1964," he said.
"To the extent that the coverage of
jurisdictions ... continues to be triggered by
what happened in 1964, it puts a great deal
of constitutional pressure on the continued
vitality of the act."
"Blood Sport of Congress"
But Debo Adegbile, associate director of
litigation at the NAACP Legal Defense and
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Educational Fund, said, "There is a very real
sense that all the ideas about ideal Voting
Rights Act statutes . . . are not always
capable of being delivered when you have to
deal with the blood sport of Congress."
Complicating the issue is an amendment by
Republican Rep. Steve King of Iowa that
would strip a requirement for multilingual
ballots from the act. That amendment has
particular resonance as illegal immigration,
assimilation and the establishment of
English as a national language have become
contentious issues during this midterm
election year.
Passage of the act was one of the great
successes of the civil rights movement.
Signed into law by President Lyndon
Johnson in 1965, it only came into being
after civil rights protests that were met with
violence.
"I was beaten and jailed because I stood up
for it," Rep. John Lewis (D-Ga.), a civil
rights leader in the 1960s, told the House on
Wednesday. He urged the House to renew
the act without amendments.
"The experience of minorities today tells us
that the struggle is not over and that the
special provisions of the Voting Rights Act
are still necessary," Lewis said. "We don't
want to go back to our dark past and we
must not go back."
The act originally placed certain states'
electoral systems, mainly in the South, under
Justice Department supervision. Later
expansions of the act included states like
Arizona and Alaska to take in Hispanic and
Native American voters.
Federal Oversight
Federal oversight was meant to prevent
those states from imposing burdensome
requirements on minority voters.
Section 5 of the act required those states to
submit any proposed changes in their
election procedures that affected voting to
the Justice Department for its approval, a
process called preclearance. For instance,
voting booths can't be moved without
federal approval.
Some jurisdictions have been exempted
from the preclearance requirements but not
most. Even so, Hasen and others say one of
the act's deficiencies is that it deals with
voting changes but doesn't address other
ways would-be voters can be thwarted, such
as happened in Florida in 2000 or Ohio in
2004.
That some states were still being required to
continue under federal oversight based on
the minority voter participation data from
decades ago was one reason renewal efforts
hit a snag.
In May, a smooth renewal of the act seemed
assured. In a rare bipartisan show,
lawmakers gathered on the Capitol steps to
show overwhelming support for the existing
law and its renewal.
But a group of Republicans from states
under Justice Department oversight derailed
the process. Rep. Lynn Westmoreland (R-
Ga.) has offered an amendment to update the
test for whether a state should be under that
oversight, a goal with which scholars like
Hasen agree.
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"An Insulting Provision"
National Review Online
May 2, 2006
Edward Blum
Just when you thought Republicans in
Congress couldn't dump on conservative
principles any more than they already have,
along comes the next show stopper.
Judiciary Committee leaders in both
chambers will introduce legislation today to
reauthorize the expiring penalty provisions
of the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA). Not
happy with the revulsion resulting from last
year's Bridge to Nowhere, the heirs of
Ronald Reagan are poised to renew until
2031 a bill that will fortify racial
gerrymandering throughout the nation.
On August 6, 2007, after more than 40 years
of going hat-in-hand to the federal
government for permission to change any
voting practice, the Deep South states along
with Texas, Arizona, and Alaska are
scheduled to be dropped from Section 5 of
the Voting Rights Act. This section-also
know as the "preclearance" provision-
requires nine states in their entirety and parts
of seven others to get permission from the
U.S. Attorney General or the D.C. federal
courts before changes can be made in voting
procedures-for example, before a polling
place can be moved or a redistricting plan
implemented. When the VRA was passed in
1965, this provision made sense-after all,
the Jim Crow South had perfected ways of
keeping blacks from the polls. Preclearance
ended that. Nevertheless, Congress
recognized that Section 5's penalty
provision was an unusual intrusion into
areas constitutionally reserved for the states,
and so it designed the provision to expire
after five years. It's still in effect today,
however, after congressional extensions in
1970, 1975, and 1982.
Unlike Section 5, the most important
provisions of the Voting Rights Act are
permanent, such as the ban on literacy tests
and grandfather clauses. Once these barriers
were eliminated in the South, black voter-
registration soared. Today, blacks and
Hispanics are full and equal participants in
the electoral process in the states covered by
section 5. In fact, recent studies conducted
for the American Enterprise Institute
indicate that the electoral position of
African-Americans and Hispanics is better
in covered states like Georgia and Texas,
than in non-covered ones like Arkansas,
Wisconsin, and Tennessee. The old
roadblocks to minority voting in Section 5
states are gone. Forever.
Yet, apart from a few courageous members
of Congress, the Republican congressional
leadership, cheered on by the Bush
Administration, is hell-bent on keeping this
system in place. Why? Two reasons: First,
Republicans don't want to be branded as
hostile to minorities, especially just months
from an election. After all, every American
knows how important the VRA was in
securing voting rights for Southern blacks.
And even though only Section 5 is up for
reauthorization, Democrats will claim
Republicans want to "turn back the clock" if
they voice any doubts. Who wants to rebut
that charge?
The second reason is that Republicans as
well as Democrats have grown to love the
racial gerrymandering Section 5 promotes.
Since Republicans control the redistricting
process in most of the states covered by
Section 5 (in fact, every whole state covered
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was as red as can be in 2004), during the
next round of redistricting GOP state
legislators will argue that Section 5 requires
them to draw ultra-safe, minority-packed
congressional districts. This bug-splat-like
racial gerrymandering has the effect of
bleaching the surrounding districts of
reliable Democratic voters, creating
numerous safe Republican districts. What
greater distain for the bedrock principle of
colorblind equal rights can there be?
Congressmen are supposed to represent
individuals in a geographically-defined
community of interest-not of skin color or
ancestry. To make matters worse, these
segregated racial homelands have been
encouraged by judges who have made a
complete mess of the Voting Rights Act
case law.
Over the last few years, the Supreme Court
has tried to clear up some of the confusion it
previously created over how states must
draw districts in order to comply with
Section 5. One case in particular, Georgia v.
Ashcroft, gave state legislatures more
leeway in unpacking minorities from ultra-
safe minority districts. The Court noted in a
5-4 decision that minorities' interests may
be better served if they aren't stuffed into
one district, creating a majority of
minorities, but instead spread into
surrounding districts where they may have
greater influence in election contests. The
conservatives on the court-Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy-
joined the majority opinion written by
Justice O'Connor by noting that "the Voting
Rights Act, as properly interpreted, should
encourage the transition to a society where
race no longer matters."
So what does the Republican Congress plan
to do with this valuable legal doctrine? Well,
they plan to overturn it by making
compliance with Section 5 dependent upon
the election of minority-preferred
candidates. This will ensure heavily packed
minority congressional districts that stifle
competition, ideologically polarize
elections, and insulate Republican
representatives from minorities and minority
representatives from Republicans.
In the end, Section 5 is not only unjust in
that it singles out some states and ignores
others when there is no longer any reason to
do so; it is also unfair to voters-especially
minority voters-because it promotes racial
gerrymandering and racial segregation,
which is just the opposite of the original
goals of the Voting Rights Act.
President Bush has said he supports
reauthorization of Section 5 and looks
forward to working with Congress on it.
Really, Mr. President, how can you support
legislation that keeps Texas in the penalty
box, but not neighboring New Mexico,
Oklahoma, or Arkansas? Do you trust these
other states to treat minority voters fairly,
but not Texas? The same needs to be asked
of every senator and congressman from the
eight other Section 5 states.
Maybe a trip to the woodshed this
November is the only thing that will get
Republicans back on track. Like the saying
goes, no matter how cynical you get in
Washington, it's impossible to keep up.
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Representative Lynn Westmoreland, a
former builder who represents a jigsaw of
predominantly white areas just south and
west of Atlanta, acknowledges that the 1965
Voting Rights Act, a cornerstone
achievement of the civil rights movement,
was necessary in its day to register blacks
and overturn decades of laws preventing
them from voting.
But times have changed, Mr. Westmoreland
said.
"It was set up to be temporary, just to get
things to where they should be," he said.
"And if you look at the results we have here
in Georgia, I think you can see that it's
worked. Its time has passed."
Mr. Westmoreland is one of many
conservative Republicans who have serious
problems with the law. Yet, even though his
party controls the White House and
Congress, the law seems in little danger of
expiring. A multiyear campaign by civil
rights leaders to reauthorize the act, parts of
which expire in August 2007, appears to be
on the verge of success.
Liberal supporters
opponents say they
reauthorized and,
strengthened in coming
of the deadline.
and conservative
expect it to be
probably, even
weeks, well ahead
"The Republicans know that if they question
the wisdom of reauthorization the
Democrats will relentlessly demagogue
them on the issue," said Roger Clegg,
president of the Center for Equal
Opportunity, which opposes reauthorization.
"They'll be called racist and accused of
wanting to turn back the clock on civil
rights. The Republicans would really like to
have this off the table."
The Voting Rights Act, a follow-up to the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, was intended to
break down barriers that had kept blacks
from registering to vote, mostly in the Deep
South. It prohibits officials from
disenfranchising blacks through gerry-
mandering or vote rigging.
Partly by outlawing poll taxes, literacy tests
and other laws intended to keep minorities
off the rolls, the act had an immediate effect
on the numbers of blacks registered in the
South. A Census report in 1982, the last time
the law was reauthorized, found that the
number of registered blacks in Mississippi
had grown to 175,000 in 1966 from 22,000
in 1960. Similar increases occurred in
Alabama, South Carolina and other Southern
states.
More gradually, but as a direct result, the
larger numbers of black voters produced a
steady increase in elected minority
candidates in the South and nationally.
Before the act, civil rights organizations
estimate, there were fewer than 300 black
elected officials in the United States, with
virtually none in the South, said Daniel
Levitas, who works with the Voting Rights
Project of the American Civil Liberties
Union in Georgia. The Joint Center for
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Political and Economic Studies in
Washington found 1,469 black elected
officials by 1970 and more than 9,500 today.
Representative John Lewis, a former
Freedom Rider who was beaten in the march
in Selma, Ala., that helped lead to the act,
said the people who felt that the law had
outlived its usefulness failed to understand
what it had done and what it needed to do.
Mr. Lewis's district, the Fifth
Congressional, encompassing much of urban
Atlanta, would look quite different had there
been no act, he said, and he is certain that
someone besides himself would have
represented it for the last 20 years.
"Hundreds of thousands of people across
America would still have been denied the
right to vote," Mr. Lewis, a liberal
Democrat, said. "So it's become almost like
apple pie, really. This act has become like
America."
President Bush has said he supports
reauthorization, without specifying what
changes in the law he might entertain.
The Republican Congressional leadership
has shown little interest in battling to
overturn it, despite many conservatives'
concerns that the act has led to
unconstitutional redistricting based on race.
A bipartisan bill to renew the law is
expected to arrive at the House Judiciary
Committee in the next week or two.
The bill is also likely to include language
intended to address Supreme Court
decisions that many supporters say have
weakened the act.
In a case involving a school board in Bossier
Parish, La., the Supreme Court ruled in 1999
that even though officials had openly
described their plan to change voting
districts as intended to keep blacks off the
board, the Voting Rights Act was not
violated because the outcome did not make
matters worse for blacks.
"There were zero black school board
members before and zero afterward, so it
hadn't been made worse," Laughlin
McDonald, director of the Voting Rights
Project, said. "That was clearly not
Congress's intention when the act was
passed in 1965, and I expect we will see
language in this bill that makes this clear
and overturns the Bossier decision."
If the bill, as anticipated, emerges unscathed
from the committee, it is expected to hit the
House floor in the spring or early summer,
where it will face opposition from some
members like Mr. Westmoreland, who
intend to submit amendments that the act's
supporters say would weaken it or render it
unconstitutional.
Many provisions are permanent. But some,
including some of the most contentious, are
temporary and have required subsequent
Congressional votes to remain.
Congress reauthorized the act for five more
years in 1970 and for seven years in 1975. In
1982, with President Ronald Reagan's
support, it was reauthorized for 25 years.
Of the sections that require reauthorization,
the two that have drawn the most attention
are Section 5, which requires some
jurisdictions to apply to the Justice
Department before changing voting laws,
and Section 203, which requires
jurisdictions with high numbers of foreign-
speaking voters to provide multilingual help
at polls.
The "preclearance" in Section 5 has drawn
the most complaints, especially from
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Southerners who feel that their region has
made substantial progress since 1965 and no
longer needs to be singled out.
Advocates of the act point out that although
most of the covered jurisdictions are in the
South, others are not, including New York
City.
Mr. Westmoreland said he intended to
propose an amendment to the
reauthorization bill that would make
preclearance nationwide. Rather than
singling out places, like Georgia, it would
require every jurisdiction to apply to the
federal government to change its voting
laws.
He said he was also likely to introduce an
amendment that would make it easier for
jurisdictions to leave the preclearance list,
another move opposed by advocates of the
act. Other congressmen are expected to offer
amendments to dilute the foreign-language
requirements of Section 203.
But at the moment it appears unlikely that
any of his proposals will attract the
necessary support, Mr. Westmoreland said,
adding, "I'm afraid what's going to happen
is this is going to be one of those middle-of-
the-night deals where you're voting on it
before you know it."
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